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ABSTRACT
Singular terms refer to objects, but what, if anything.
do general terms refer to? Fregefs celebrated distinction
between concepts and objects gives rise to a difficult
problem. According to Frege's theory, predicates refer to
concepts, no concept 1s an object, and singular terms like
'the president of the United States' refer to objects. It
15 thus a consequence of Frege's theory that the concept
horse 1s not a concept.
In Chapter I I introduce the problem and ar~ue that Frege
was wrong to dismiss it as a mere "awkwardness of language".
In Chapter II I examine solutions proposed by Fre~e, Michael
Dumrnett, Edwin Martin, and Montgomery Furth and conclude
that none works. In Chapter III I examineFre~'sBegrlffsschrlft,
written before he developed his theory about concepts.
In the course of my discussion I demonstrate the consistency
of its logical system, which has been cansidered.problematlc.
I also argue that problems with its interpretation fore-
shadow the problem about concepts.
Thesis Supervisor: George Boalas
Title: Professor of Philosophy
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6CHAPTER I r:JTRODUCTIO:,r: THE PRtJBLEi-1
Fre~e's philosophy of language ~ay be viewed as
~ons1sting of two intimately related theories: a theory of
synt~A and a theory of semantics. The syntactic theory
concerns the expressions o~ language and provides an analys~s
of the structure of sen~ences and ~heir ~arts. It describes
how expressions fit together to form more complex ex~ress1ons.
The semantic theory concerns the meanin~s of expressions
and describes how the meanin~s of sentence 9arts deter~1ne
the meanings and truth-values of a sentence.
A striking feature of Fre~e's philosophy of lan~ua~e is
the way in which the semantic theory parallels the syntactic
theor~. The syntactic theory divides expressions into two
mutually exclusive categories and the semantic theory
divides the meanings of expressions into two corres90ndln~
categories. Expressions are either complete or incomplete.
Complete expressions have complete meanings and incomplete
expressions have incomplete mea111ngs. The dist inct ion
between complete and incomplete expressions and the
corresponding distinction for their meanings are responsible
for an interestin~ problem in Frege's philosophy of langua~e.
Before r state the problem I shall sketch the two theories
and then develop those aspects of the theories that are
relevant to my discussion of the problem about concepts.
Meanin~ful expressions are either proper names or
7function names. Proper names are complete expressions and
function names are incomplete expressions. Function names
are incomplete in that they hav~ holes or ~aps for names
of arguments. When these ~ap5 are filled by appropriate
ar~ument names the result is a complete expression, or
proper name. Among function names are pred1c~tes or
"concept words". The ~omrleticn of a ~oncept word or
predicate by a proper name is a sentence. Thus sentences
are counted as proper names.
The function na~e '( )+3', ~or example, :s ~o~pleted
by the yroper name '2' to yield the proper name '2+3'.
The predicate '( ) is a city' 1s completed by the ~roper
name 'Paris' to yield the sentence 'Paris is a city'.
Frege distinguishes different levels of function names.
A function name 1s of the first level if its argument
place accepts proper names. A function name 1s of the
(n+l)st level if its argument place accepts nth level function
names.
Frege makes two important distinctions in his semantic
theory. One 1s between sense and reference. Generally,
each sentence part a~d each sentence has a sense and a
reference. The sense and reference of a sentence are
determined by the senses and references of its parts. The
senses and references of sentence parts fit together in a
8way that parallels the way in which sentence parts fit
together to yield a sentence. 1
The other distinction 1s between object and func~1on and
corresponds to the syntactic distinction between complete
and incomplete expressions. The theory divides the senses
and references of expressions into two mutually exclusive
categories. Jyst as expressions are complete or incomplete,
so are the senses and references of expressions. Complete
expressions have com~lete senses and references and incomplete
expressions have incomplete senses and re~erence3. The
senses and references of complete expressions are objects
and the senses and references of incomplete ~xpressions are
functions. Thus functions are incomplete and objects are
complete.
Proper names refer to objects and function names refer
to functions. Moreover, objects are refer~ed to only by
proper names and functions are referred to only by function
names. No complete expression refers to any incomplete
entity and no incomplete expression refers to any complete
entity. I am prlmaril~i concerned with the distinction
between functions and objects in the realm of reference. I
am expeciaLly interested in Frege's doctrines that predicates
refer to concepts and concepts are incomplete or n'lnsaturated".
1. In the body of the thesis I say little about sen~e. This
is not the distinction with which I am concerned.
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There are levels of functions corresponding to the levels
of function names. A function 1s of the first level if it
takes objects as ar~uments. A function is of the (n+l)st
level if it takes nth level functions as arguments. Functions
yield values for all arguments of the appropriate type and
the value of a function for a ~1ven argument of the appropriate
type ~s always an object. Among functions are ~once~ts and
among obj ects are truth-values. Ft-t.:ge argues that truth-
values are objects as follows:
A statement contains no empty place, and therefore
we must re~ard what it stands for as an object. But
what a statement stands for is a ~ruth-value. Thus
the two truth-values are objects.
Frege argues here that truth-values are objects because they
are referred to by complete expressions. It seems that
an object, for Frege, is anything rererred to by a proper
name.
The notion of object and function are correlative
notions. In the follcwlng passage, Frege attempts to define
'object':
... the question arises what it is that we are here
calling an object. I regard a regular definition
as impossible, since we have someth1n~ too simple
to admit of logical analysis. It is only possible
to indicate what is meant. Here I can only say
briefly: An object 1s anything that 1s not a function,
so that an expression for it does not contain an
empty place.3
2. Peter Geach and Max Black, eds., Translations from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege-COxtord: Basil
Blackwell, 1970), p. 49.
3. Ibid.
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Objects, then, are entities referred to by complete expressions,
or proper names. At the same time, 'proper name' is defined
as follows:
I call ftnything a proper name i~ it is a sl~n for an
ob,ject.
?rege's explanation of what a concept is is not much more
enlightening:
Kerry contests what he cal15 my definition or
'concept'. I would remark) in the first place,
that my explanation is not meant as a proper
definition. One cannot require that everything
shall be defined, anymore than one can require
that a chemist shall decompose every substance.
What 1s simple cannot be decomposed, and what is ~
logically simple cannot have a proper definition.'
He later says:
The concept is predicative. It is, in 6act , the
reference of a grammatical predicate.
Thus the notions of concept and object are primitive)
correlative notions. In what follows I attempt to clarify
Frege's characterizations of objects, functions, and
concepts.
We have seen that the sentence 'Paris is a city' is
the completion of the predicate '( ) 1s a city' by the
4. Geach and Black, p. 47.
5. Ibid.,p. 43.
6. Iblrt.
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proper name 'Paris'. The reference or the sentence is
determined by the references of its parts in the following
sense. The reference of I( ) 15 a city' is the concept £ill
and the reference of 'Paris' is Paris. The value of the
concept city for the argument Paris 1s the True just in case
Paris falls under the concept city. The reference of the
sentence is the value of the concept city for the argument
Paris. A first-level concept is a first-level function that
takes objects as arguMents and yields the True or the False
as value. The value of a concept for a ~1ven object as
argument is the True if that object falls under the concept;
otherwise it 1s the False. Hence, since Paris does fall under
the concept city, the reference of the sentence 1s the True.
To each function there corresponds an object called its
"value-ran~e". The value of a runct10n for an argument is,
according to Frege, "the result of' completing the function
with the aI:~ument".7
If we write
x
2
- 4x = xex-4)
we have not put one function equal to another,
but only the values of one equal to another ...
But we can also say: 'the value ran~e of the
function xex-4) is equal to that of the function
x2-4x t , and here ~e have an equality between
ranges of values.
7. Ibid., p. 25.
8. Ibid., p. 26.
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He goes on to say that "value ranges of functions are
objects, whereas functions themselves are not."9 A concept
is a function whose value 1s always a truth-value and the
value-range of a concept 1s its extension. The extension
of a concept may be thought of as the collectlonlO of all
and only those objects that fall under the concept. Thus,
the extension of the concept city, for example, is the class
of all cities. Since extensions are objects, the extension
of a concept 1s not to be identified with the concept.
Objects and concepts are fundamentally different and
hence concepts cannot stand in the same relations as objects.
Identity is a relation that may only hold between objects;
however, there 1s an analogous relation that may hold between
concepts. A concept A is the same as a concept B if and
only if every object that falls under A falls under Band
every object that falls under B falls under A. That is,
two concepts are the same if and only if their extensions are
identical.
Frege provides a principle of sUbst1tut1v1ty for
predicates or concept ·worGs. If two predicates have the same
9. Ibid., p. 32.
10. The is a somewhat oversimplified interpretation of
Frege's notion of extension. I give a more detailed
explanation later in the section ort Furth but for my present
purpose this will suffice.
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reference, they may be substituted for one another preserv1n~
truth-value:
Just as proper names can replace one another salva
verltate, so can two concept~words, if their
extensions are the same. II
So far I have said little about Frege's distinctions
be~ween complete and incomplete entities. The corresponding
distinction for expressions is clearer. An incomplete
expression contains one or more gaps as argument places,
while complete expressions have no gaps. So, 'Frege', 'the
even prime number', and 'Massachusetts' are complete
expressions, while '( ) 1s happy', 'the capital of ( )',
and '( )2, are incomplete. It should be noted that Frege
counts any expression of the form 'the so-and-so' as a proper
name. He says, "The singular definite article always
indicates an object, whereas the 1ndef1~lte article accompanies
a concept-word".l2 Ths distinction between complete and
incomplete entities 1s not as clear and Frege's discussion
of it tends to be metaphorical. I shall not examine these
metaphors at this po~nt. It suffices, for my present purpose,
to point out that Fr~~e does make a strict division
between two kinds of entities and that this division corresponds
to the syntactic division. Objects are referred to by
11. Gottlob Frege, Posthumous Writings (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, Basil Blackwell, 1979), p. 118.
12. Geach and Black, p. 45.
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prope~ names and are called "complete" or "saturated".
Functions and concepts are referred to by function names and
predlca t es al1d are ~alled"1ncomp1ete" or "unsaturated". Fre~e
does talk as if these latter entities contain gaps that
correspond to the argument-places of their names. Thus
this semantic division appears to be derived from the
5yntact1c division. It is important to keep in ~lnd that no
gapless, complete expression has an incomplete reference.
The theory precludes the possibility of a proper name
referring to a function or concept.
I shall now give a preliminary statement of the problem
with which I am concerned. According to Frege's theory, the
predicate '1s a horse' refers to a concept. If asked,
"Which concept?". one's answer would be, "the concept horse".
Frege would say that
Secretariat 1s a horse
says of Secretariat that he falls under the concept horse.
However, by Fre~ets criteria, 'the concept horse' is a proper
name. If it has.a reference, its reference 1s an object,
not a concept. It follows, then, that
The concept horse 1s not a concept, but rather
an object.
This is paradoxical. Given any predicate or concept word,
it seems to be impossible to specify which concept it refers
15
to. Attempts to name a concept result in naming an ob~ect.
This 1s a problem that Frep;e discusses in "On Concept
and Object". In that article he replies:
It m~st be recognized that here we are confronted by
an awkwardness of language~ which I admit cannot be
avoided, if we say that the concept horse is not a
concept, whereas, e.g., the city of Berlin 1s a city,
and the volcano Vesuvius 1s a volcano. Language 1s
here in a predicament that justifies the departure
from custom. 13
The problem, of co~rse, can be avoided if the references
of function names and predicates are taken to be objects.
Why did Frege think that the reference or a predicate must
be incomp lete or "\J~nsaturated". Frep;e never really answers
this question, but his writings do provide a few clues. In
"On Concept and Ob.ject" he writes:
Somebody may think that this 1s an artificially
created difficultyj that there 1s no need at all
to take account of what I call a concept; that
one might, like Kerry, regard an object's falling
under a concept as a relation in which the same
thing could occur now as object, now as concept.
The words 'object' and 'concept' would then serve
only to indicate the different position in the
relation. This may be done, but anybody who thinks
the difficulty is avoided in this way 1s very
much mistaken; it is only shifted. For not all
the parts of a thought can be complete; at least
one must be 'unsaturated' or ~~edicative; otherwise
they would not hold together.
13. Ibid. J p. 46 .
14. Ibid., p. 54.
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Here Frege starts out to explain why the reference of a
predicate must be unsaturated, yet he shifts, instead, to
talk about the sense or a predicate. He argues that at least
one part of the sense of a sentence must be unsat~rated,
for otherwise the thou~ht does not "hold together". He
continues:
FOI' example the sense of the phrase 'the number 2'
does not hold together with that of the expression
'the concept prime number' without a link. We apply
such a link in the sentence 'the number 2 falls under
the concept prime numoer'; it js contained in the
words 'falls under', which ne~d to be completed in
two ways -- by a subject and an accusative; and only
because their sense 1s thus 'unsaturated' are they
capable of serving as a link. Only when they have
been supplemented in this two-fold respect do we get
a complete sense, a thought. I say that such words
or phrases stand for a relat1on. 15
It does not follow from anything Fre~e says here that the
reference of a predicate must be unsaturated. According to
Frege, being unsaturated or incomplete 1s essential to the
function, but he has not told us why. He has argued that
the sense of a sentence has senses as parts and that not
all of the parts of a thought can be complete. At least
one part of a complete thought must be unsaturated in order
for the parts to adhere to one another. Does Frege intend
a similar explanation for references of sentence parts?
There is some evidence that Frege does believe that the
15. Ibid.
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reference of part of a sentence must be unsaturated in order
for the reference of the whole to be complete. For example,
when discussing the references of concept words he writes:
This predlcat1ve component of our sentence .•. 1s
also meaningful •.• We call it a concept-word •••
Just as it itself appears unsaturated, there
is also something in the realm of [references]
corresponding to it; we call this a concept.
This unsaturatedness of one of the ~o~pone~ts is
necessary, since otherwise the parts do not hold
to~ether. Of course two complete wholes can stand
in a relation to one and another, but then this
relation is a third ~le~ent - and one ~h~~ 15doubl~ ~nsaturated.lo
Here Frege does offer the same sort of explanation for the
unsaturatedness of the references of incomplete expressions
that he offers for the senses of those expressions. He argues
that two complete entities cannot"adhere" or "hold together"
to form a complete, whole reference. This talk 1s, however,
metaphorical and not a wholly satisfying response to our
question. Frege's argument here is also puzzling, for the
reference of a sentence is a truth-value. Truth-values are
not composed of parts 1n the way that thoughts are. Thus,
talk about the references of sentence parts adhering to one
another to yield a complete reference seems irrelevant.
Frege offers another sort of explanation for the
incompleteness of references of function names:
16. Frege, Posthumous Writings, p. 177.
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I am concerned to show that the argument does not
belong with the function, but goes to~ether with
the :'~rlc:ion tc mat:e a ~:~(:lete· Ilhole ~or i-.he
f~~2~icn by itself must ~~ called inc0mpl~:e 1n need
of suoolementation, or 'unsaturated'. And in this
respect functions dif~er fundamentally from nU~bers.17
This passage suggests that t·he ir:com;:·leteness o·r the f'j,nj~t:lon
is derived from the incompleteness o~ the expressions that
re~er to them. There is a strain of :his throughout ?re~e's
writings about concepts and functions. At times it 15
explicit:
Accordingly I call the function itself unsaturated
or in need of supplmentat10n because its name has
first to be completed with the sign of an argument
if we are tg obtain a reference that is comolete
in 1tself. 1 · .
We have seen that Frege's semantic theory strictly parallels
his syntactic theory. Here it looks as if the syntax, in a
sense, "determines" the semantics. In particular, since
predicates and function names have gaps or holes, so do their
references. On F~e~ets view, the function and argument
fit together in just the same way the function name fits
together with the argument name. While Frege never really
explains why the references of predicates must be incomplete,
the doctrine of unsaturated reference is central to his
theory about concepts. The following passage provides a
17. Geach and Black, p. 24.
18. Frege, Posthumous Writings, p. 119.
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good statement of his view:
•.. the unsaturatedness of the concept brings it
about that the object, in effecting the saturation,
engages immediately with the concept, without need
of any special cement. Object and concept are
fundamentally made for each other ... 19
Given Frege's characterization of functions and objects,
:he question arises wh~ther function names and predicates are
functions or objects. Frege regards the sentence
John met Mary
as the completion of the predicate expression '( ) met Mary'
by the proper name 'John'. On Frege's view, are we to regard
the expression 'met Mary' as a function or an object?
P.T. Geach20 maintains that Frege regards function names as
linguistic functions. Accordingly, the sentence 'John met
Mary' is taken to be the value of the function 'met Mary'
for the proper name 'John' as argument. Thus the sentences
John met Mary
Smith met Mary
Jones met Mary
are values of the same function for the arguments 'John',
'Smith', and 'Jones', respectively. Geach's view is an
19 . Ib i d., p. 178.
20 . P. T. Geac h, "Names and Ident 1ty", in r~ind and Language,
edt Sarn~el Guttenplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975),
p. 139.
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attractive one when one considers sentences like
John met Mary at the theater.
One way in which this sentence may be viewed by Frege 1s
as the completion of the predicate expression
John met at the theater
by the proper name 'Mary'. According to Frege's theory,
this incomplete expression cannot be counted as an object,
for it 1s not a complete or "saturated" entity. It is not
simply a sequence of words; it contains a gap. Hence
predicate expressions and function names cannot generally
be taken to be objects. It 1s in keeping with Frege's
characterization of functions and objects to view function
names and predicates as functions. Of course, if predicates
are functions, they cannot be referred to by proper
names.
I can now state the problem in which I am interested
in a fuller and more precise way. According to Prege, '1s
a horse' refers to a concept. Which concept? The concept
horse. But 'the concept horse' is a proper name and hence
it does not refer to a concept. It follows, then, that
(1) The concept horse 1s not a concept
and
21
(2) 'Is a horse' does not refer to the concept horse.
A parallel argument yields
(3) The reference of 'is a horse' is not a concept
and
(4) 'Is a horse' does not refer to the re~erence of
'1s a horse'.
Each of (1)-(4) follows from yet conflicts with Frege's
theory. It seems that any attempt to specify the reference
of a predicate leads to a contradiction.
The problem is worse yet. ~ot only are we unable to
talk about particular concepts other than by using predicate
expressions, but it seems that we are unable to make general
statements about concepts and functions. Consider:
(5) is a concept.
For (5) to be completed so that the result is grammatical,
it must be completed with a proper name. That 1s, 'is a
concept' 1s a first-level function name that refers to a
concept that only accepts objects as arguments. All
grammatical completions of (5) are false. Hence we cannot
truthfully say of any entity that it is a concept. Now
consider, for instance,
22
(6) All concepts are ~unctions
(7) All concepts are unsaturated
and
(8)
r~Ie ,~an not
and
No concept is an object.
express (6)-(3) as
(\iX) (x is a concept ~ x 1s a function)
~"Vx) (x 1s a concept ~ - x 1s saturated)
( 8') ('t x ) (x i sac0 nee p t :;) - x 1san 0 b,j e c t ) .
(6')-(8') are trivially true on Frege's theory because every
grammatical completion of the predicates 'is a concept', 'is
a function', and '1s unsaturated' is false. If we add the
claim, '(~x) (x 1s a concept)', to each of (6' )-(8') then due
to the peculiarity of the predicate '1s a concept', the results
are false. Since '1s a concept' is a first-level predicate,
general talk .about conceptsrequ1res first-order quantification;
however, because concepts are not objects, first-order
quant1flcat1onal logic is not adequate for the expression of
(6)-(8). It seems that Frege's theory does not allow the
formulation of its own doctrines.
Frege recognizes that his doctrines about functions,
concepts, and .objects are problematic, yet he writes:
23
I admit that there is quite a peculiar obstacle
in the way of an understanding with my reader. By
a kind of necessity of language, my ex~resslons,
taken literally, sometimes miss my thought; !
mention an object, when what I intend is a concept.
I fully realize that in such cases I was relying upon
a reader who would be ready to meet me ha~f-way --
who does not begrudge me a pinch of salt. 1
In what follows I examine the solutions to this problem
offered by several readers of Frege's work who de not
"begrudge a pinch of salt". I maintain, however, that Frege
was wrong to dismiss the problem as a mere "awkwardness of
language" and I argue that none of the solutions proposed by
his sympathetic readers works.
21. Geach and Black, p. 54.
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CHAPTER II: FOUR SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
1. Frege's solution
Frege must have realized that his published response to
the problem 1s not a satisfactory one, for in a later essay
he again d.eals wit h t he pro b1err. and !Jropo ses ~·:ha t; is taken to
be a solution. In that unpublished essay, which has been
translated as "Comments on Sense and Meaning", Frege
recognizes that we seem to be barred· from specifying or
naming the concept that corresponds to a given concept word
or predicate. He says that, properly, the expression 'the
reference of the concept word A' should be rejected as
inadequate, and he proposes:
It would be better to say "what the concept-word A
refers to"; then this 1s (if need be) to be used
predicatively: "Jesus is what the concept-wold 'man'
refers to" in the sense of "Jesus is a man".
What 1s Frege's proposal? He is attempting to find an
expression that has the same reference as, say, 'man', and
yet retains the pred1cative nature of the predicate
expression 'is a man,.2 We have seen that 'the
1. Frege, Posthumous Writings, p. 122.
2. According to Frege, the copula is a mere sign of
predication. The copula does not accompany a concept word.
See Frege, Posthumous Writings, p. 177 and Geach and Black,
p. 43.
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concept man' and 'the reference of 'man" fail to meet the
requirements, so Frege proposes that the expression
(a) what the concept-word 'man' refers to
has the requisite incompleteness characteristic of predicate
expressions. Furthermore, (a) has the same reference as
(b) is a man.
Thus, given Frege's principle of substitutiv1ty for concept
words,
(3) Jesus 1s what 'man' refers to
has the same ref~rence as
(4) Jesus 1s a man.
Now, we are instructed, we can avoid the use of inadequate,
misleading expressions such as 'the reference of 'horse' t by
using 'what 'horse' refers to' in its stead. When asked
"Which concept does the concept word A refer to?" we may
respond, "What the concept word A refers to".
Sentence (3), however, requires further examination; for
its truth appears to conflict with certain doctrines of
Frege's theory. In his essay "Schroeder's Vorlesungen Ueber
die Algebra der Log1k", Frege 1s careful to point out that
those objects that fall under a given concept are not named
26
by the corresponding concept word.
The word 'common name' 15 confus1n~ here, for it
makes it look as though the common name stood in
the same, or much the same, relation to the objects
that fall under the concept as the croner name does
to a single object. Nothing could be more false!3
This point 1s amplified later:
The word 'planet' has no direct relation at all to
the Earth, but only to a concept that the Earth,
among other things, falls under; thus its relation
to the E~rth is an indirect one, by way of the
concept.
Hence, 'man' bears no direct relation to Jesus or any other
man. Any relation that does obtain between the word t~an'
and any particular man is mediated by a certain concept.
I have said that these passages appear to conflict with
the truth of (3). What does the conflict consist in? It
1s clear that Frege would affirm
(5) 'Man' does not rerer to Jesus.
'Man' does have a reference, but its reference 1s not an
object and Jesus is an object. To put this another way,
(6) Jesus is not the reference of 'man'
3. Geach and Black, p. 105.
4. Ibid.
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1s true. Yet (6) contains the misleading expression 'the
reference orman". If (6) is well-formed, it denies an
identity between two objects.
According to Frege's prescription, the occurrence of
'the reference of 'man" in (6) should be replaced by the
expression 'what 'man' refers to'. Thus we obtain
(7) Jesus is not what 'man' refers to.
But (7) contradicts (3). What has happened? If (5) 1s
equivalent to (7) then Frege has been caughtlnacontr~dictlon.
There 1s a way out for Frege. He may deny the equivalence
of (5) and (7). He might claim that (7) 1s ambiguous. If
it 1s, then what are its various readings? The 'is' in (7)
may be either the '1s' of identity or the 'ls' of predication.
Suppose, first, that it 1s the 'ls' of identity. Then (7)
amounts to
(8) Jesus ~ what 'man refers to.
If (8) 1s well-formed, then, since identity can only be
meaningfully asserted of objects, 'what 'man' refers to' must
be a proper name and refer to an object. But if 'what 'man'
refers to' refers to an object, then
(9) What 'man' refers to 1s an object
must be t~ue. Yet on Frege's theory, (9) is false. Hence,
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Frege must regard (8) as false.
Suppose, then, that the 'ls' in (7) is the 'ls' of
predication. Then (7) says of Jesus that he does not fall
under a certain concept. Which concept? The concept ref~rred
to by 'what 'man' refers to'. In this case, 'what 'man'
refers to' is to be taken as a predicate. Frege would say
that it refers to, what we improperly ~all, the concept man.
That is, Frege would argue that (7) just means
(10) Jesus 1s not a man.
So, on this construal, (7) 1s false.
Therefore, either 'what 'man' refers to' does not
refer to a concept, or (7) 1s false. But we have seen that
if 'what 'man' refers to' 1s taken to be a proper name (7)
is false. Thus there is no contradiction. Frege can argue
that (7) is not equivalent to (5) and that (7) 1s the negation
of (3).
So, Frege's proposal does not conflict with the doctrines
of his theory. The expression 'what 'man' refers to' can
be used predlcatively, and, 1n sentence (3), it has the same
reference as 'is a man'. Yet, has Frege accomplished anything?
If he is merely looking for an expression to replace 'the
concept man' and 'the reference of 'man" that refers to a
concept and retains the appropriate incompleteness of a
predicate, then he already has one. The predicate '1s a man'
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satisfies those criteria. How does the introduction of 'what
'man' refers to' constitute an advance toward a solution to
the problem of specifying the references of predicates? We
can now say
(11) Smith is what 'man' refers to
an1
(12) Jones is what 'man' refers to
where the "what"-phrase occurs pred:!.catlvely in (11) and (12).
The 'is' that occurs in (11) and (12) 1s the '1s' of predication.
But we already had the means to express (11) and (12). Why
should those sentences be preferable to
(13) Smith 1s a man
and
(14) Jones 1s a man?
Frege must have thought that his introduction of "what"-phrases
accomplishes more than this. After making his proposal to
use "what"-phrases, he goes on to say:
If we keep all this in mind, we are in a good position
to assert, "What two concept-words refer to is the
same if and only if the associated extensions coincide.",
without being led astra~ into errors by the improper
use of the word "same".
5. Frege, Posthumous Writings, p. 122
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I gather, then, that Frege believes that the introduction
of these "what"-phrases enables us to more precisely formulate
definitions and principles concerning concepts. Reme~ber
that identity 1s a relation that obtains only between objects.
No relation that obtains between objects obtains between
concepts. The expression 'is the same as' refers to a
relation that holds between concepts. Frege has given a
shorthand definition of 'is the same as' in the passage
cited above. I shall attempt to state the definition more
fully, using the prescribed "what"-phrases.
(S) What concept word A refers to is the sa~e
as what concept word B refers to if and only
if the extension of what concept word A refers
to 1s identical with the extension of what
concept word 8 refers to.
If we examine (S), it appears that the expression 'what the
concept word A refers to' and 'what the concept word B refers
to' occur as proper names. Otherwise (8) would fail to be
complete and well-formed. Consider a particular instance
of (S):
(15) What 'even' refers to 1s the same as what
'divisible by two' refers to.
Now, if 'what 'even' refers to' and 'what 'divisible by
two' refers to' occur predlcatively in (15), then (15) would
not be a well-formed sentence. The expression 'is the same
as' would be flanked by incomplete expressions and hence the
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whole would fail to be complete. Roughly, (15) would ha'le
the form of:
~ ( ) is the same as ~ ( ).
The problem is a general one, and I believe that Frege's
introduction of "what"-phrases 1s of no help. We are told
that 'what 'horse' refers to' is to be used predicatively;
it refers to a concept. That is,
(16) 'What 'horse' refers to' refers to a concept.
Equivalently,
(17) What 'horse' refers to is a concept.
But 'what 'horse' refers to' occurs as a proper name in (17).
Consider:
CIa) 1s a concept.
For (18) to be completed so that the result 1s grammatical,
it must be completed with a proper name. That ls, '1s a
concept' is a first-level function name and it refers to a
concept that only accepts objects as arguments. Thus if
(17) is well-formed it is false. I conclude from this
that 'what 'horse' refers to' 1s ambiguous. It may occur
in a sentence either as a proper name or as a concept name.
According to Frege 'what 'horse' refers to' has
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the same reference as 'is a horse', and so may be substituted
for it preserving truth-value. Yet it Is not the case that we
may always substitute '1s a horse' for 'what 'horse' refers
to'. For example, (17) 1s false but it 1s a well-formed
sentence. If we substitute '1s a horse' for 'what 'horse'
refers to' in (17) the result 1s
(19) Is a horse 1s a concept.
(19) 1s nonsensical. Thus the expressions are not generally
co-referential. I am assuming a certain principle of
sUbstltut1v1ty here that Frege never explicitly states.
Namely that jf two expressions are co-referential, they may
be substituted for one another in a sentence preserving
grammat1callty. Frege does. or course, state that co-referential
expressions may be substituted tor one another preserving
truth-value, and the analogue for grammat1ca11ty Is, I believe,
a weaker principle. For how could an ungrammatical sentence
have any truth-value?
A completion of (18) 1s grammatical Just in case the
blank 1s filled by a proper name. Yet if the blank 1s filled
by a proper name the result 1s always false. This is, of
course, just another version of the problem with the concept
horse. It seems that we cannot say truthfully of any entity
that 1s a concept.
The problem has not been solved by Frege's proposal.
Frege has exploited the fact that these "what"-phrases are
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~b1guous. He was aware that proper names may occur as concept
words, and concept words as proper names. We have seen that
"what"-phrases may occur either as predicates or as proper
names in sentences.
For each predicate expression, 'is an A', there 1s a
corresponding "what"-phrase. 'what the concept word 'A'
refers to'. If the corresponding "what"-phrases can occur
pred1cat1vely only in those contexts that will grammatically
accept the straightforward predicate expression, '1s an
At, then there does not appear to be any advantage to using
the corresponding "what"-phrase in its place. Furthermore,
it does seem to be the case that 'what the concept word A refers
to' may occur predlcat1vely only in those contexts that
grammatically accept '1s an A'. In those contexts that
accept the "what"-phrase but do not accept 'is an A', 'what
A refers to' occurs as a proper name. (S) and (17) are
examples of this.
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2. Dummett's solution
Frege recognizes that his theory seems to prevent us
from naming concepts. and I have found his attempt to solve
the problem to be unsatisfactory. for the problem merely
emerges in a different guise. It remains that we are forced
to use proper names to refer to concepts. Frege's theory
does not provide an alternative.
Frege also recognizes the problem with '1s a concept'
and '1s a function'. They are inappropriate for their use
because they refer to first-level concepts. Suitable
predicates must be of the second-level, for they must accept
first-level function names in their argument places. He
says:
In the proposition 'something 1s an obJect', the
word 'something' takes an argument of the first
kind and stands tor a proper name. Thus whatever
we cut in place of 'something' we always get a true
proposition; for a function name cannot take the
place of 'something'. Here we find ourselves in
a situation where the nature of language forces us
to make use of imprecise expressions. The proposition
'A 1s a function' 1s such an expression: it is always
imprecise; for 'A' stands for a proper name. The
aoncept of a function must be a second-level concept.
While I am writing this I am well aware of having
again expressed myself imprecisely. Sometimes this
is just unavoidable. All that matters is that we
know that we are doing it. and how it happens. 1
Thus Frege is aware of the problem yet he offers no solution;
while he suggests that the suitable predicates must be or the
1. Gottlob Frege, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Basil Blackwell, 1980),
p. 136.
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second level, he does not provide any alternatives to the
unsuitable predicates.
Michael Dummett believes that Frege does resolve the
paradox. He concentrates on two of the s~ptoms I have
mentioned. First, that we cannot truthfully' say of any
entity that it 1s a concept, and second, that we cannot specify
the reference or any given pred1~ate. He does not deal with
the difficulty or expressing generallt1~s about concepts. but
I presume that he believes that his solution to the general
problem treats all the sYmptoms. His discussion is an
elaboration and development of Frege's suggestions.
Dummett begins by noting that Frege is aware of the
peculiar feature of the predicate '1s a concept'. In
accordance with Frege's remarks, Dummett proposes to expel
the word 'concept' and he plans to construct a suitable
predicate to replace it. He does not argue in favor of its
explus10nj he merely says that since its use leads to
dirficulties, we should not use it. Whereas Frege says that
its use 1s sometimes unavoidable, Dummett believes that it
can be uniformly replaced by a second-level predicate. There
are other predicates that cause trouble for Frege's theory
and presumably Dummett wants to expel these, too. Thus
Dummett must both formulate a general way to name first-level
concepts so that their names may fill the argument place
of a second-level predicate, and construct a replacement for
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'is a concept'. For this project Dummett relies heavily on
Frege's proposal to use "what f'-phrases in place of the "m1s-
leading" proper names as concept names.
I have already shown that "what"-phrases may be used
predlcat1vely, yet I have argued that they are ambiguous and
may occur as proper names. Dummett holds that "what"-
phrases of the form 'what A refers ~o" \-lhere, A is a concept
word, may only occur pred1cat1vely. In support of this he
implicitly invokes two principles, one for proper names and
an analogous one for concept names. He notes that all
instances of the following principle are true:
(PN) If ~ 1s a referring proper name, then a and
,. what a refers to" are co-referential.
For example, 'Paris' and 'what 'Paris' refers to' both refer
to Paris. By analogy, Dummett argues, all instances or the
corresponding principle for concept names are true:
(eN) if, is a referring concept name, the ~ and
r what ~ refers to' are co-referential.
Hence, Dummett concludes, 'is a horse' and 'what '1s a horse'
refers to' are co-referential and completely interchangeable
with one another. My counterexample to (eN) was
(1) What 'is a horse' refers to is a concept.
(1) Is· a counterexample only if we allow 'is a concept' as a
legitimate predicate. It is not difficult, however, to find
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other counterexamples, for just as proper names may occur as
concept names, so "what"-phrases may occur as proper names.
Consider, again, for example,
(2) What '1s even' refers to 1s the same as what
'1s divisible by two' refers to.
If (2) is a granunatical, complete sentence, then the "~lhat"-
phrases occur there as proper names; for if they do not occur
as proper names (2) would contain gaps and hence would not be
a well-formed sentence. Perhaps Du~~ett would argue that
'1s the same as' 1s "misleading" in the same way that '1s a
concept' and '1s a function' are. However, then it would
look as though he wants to say that wherever "what"-phrases
occur as proper names there 1s something "wrong" with the
predicate that occurs in that context.
So far Dummett has just followed Frege. As Frege
prescribes, predicates such as 'is a concept' should not be
used and "what"-phrases are to be used pred1catlvely to
replace the problematic proper names such as 'the concept
horse' and 'the reference of '1s a horse". Yet this does
not constitute a solution to the problem of naming concepts.
Even if we allow Frege and Dumrnett these steps, we still
lack the means for specifying the reference of a given
predicate. Though "what"-phrases may indeed be used predicatlvely
it 1s not obvious that the introduction of these expressions
1s an advance toward a solution.
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It remains for Dumrnett to replace 'is a concept' with
a suitable second-level predicate and construct a means by
which we may name concepts. Frege does not provide a
replacement for '1s a concept', though he does claim that the
problem does not exist in his symbolic language:
In a conceptual notation we can introduce a precise
expression for what we mean when we call something a
function (of the first level with one argument),
e.g.: "t(E)'. Accordingly, 'f (E • 3'" 4)' would
express precisely what is expressed imprecisely in
the proposition '~ • 3 + ~ 1s a function'. Whatever
we put in place or ~ ( ) we always get a true proposition
because we can only put names of functions of the
first level with one arguments for the argument place
here 1s of the second k1nd. 2
To devise such an expression of natural language, Dummett
examines the use of "what"-clauses (relative clauses). He says
that we may use relative clauses such as 'what I am not' to
form first-level predicates. We merely supply an argument-
place and copula. Thus, for example, ' ... is what I am
not' is a first-level predicate that takes proper names as
arguments. The predicate may be completed with the proper
name 'Smith' to form the sentence 'Smith is what I am not'.
Dummett plans to use this feature of relative clauses to
form second-level predicates. He says:
There 1s, however, another use of relative clauses
which represents quantification over concepts. On
this use, which also employs the verb 'to be', what
is formed is a second-level predicate. 3
2. Ibid.
3. Michael Dumrnett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (New York:
Harper and Row, 1973), p. 215.
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If we are to form second-level predicates which accept f1rst~
level concept names as arguments, then in order to complete
these predicates we must be able to construct expressions that
are appropriate for their argument places. Dummett gives
detailed instructions for this. In the simplest case, a
first-level predicate 1s rormed from a sentence by omitting
an occurrence of a proper name. For instance, from the
sentences 'Smith 1s a doctor' and Uones 1s sad' we form the
first-level predicates '1s a doctor' and 'is sad' by omitting
the occurences of 'Smith' and ',Jones t respect1~,ely·. i·Jew we
can form what Dummett calls "pred1catlve expressions" from
the predicates by merely dropping the copula. The results
are 'a doctor' and 'sad'. These, Dummett claims, are predlcatlve
and are suitable arguments for second-level predicates.
One might object here that Dummett ignores Frege's
dictum that predicate expressions are incomplete and corne
equipped with gaps, and that 'a doctor' and 'sad' are not
pred1cat1ve, in Frege's sense, for they are not supplied with
argument places. Although Du~ett does not recognize this,
he could respond that Frege would count these expressions as
pred1cat1ve and that they do refer to ·~oncepts. Frege provides
a sort of test for concepthood:
I regard it as essential for a concept that the
question4whether something falls under it have asense ..•
4. Frege, Correspondence, p. 101.
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Dummett could argue that it does make sense to ask of an
object whether it is a doctor or whethe~ it is sad, so for
the time being we shall count 'a doctor' and 'sad', and the
like, as predicatlve expressions where the argument places
are implicit. There are clear cases where such expressions
are pred1cative. Consider, for example.
(3) A whale is a mammal.
'A whale' occurs predlcatively in (3) and rerers to a first-
level concept. The sentence may be symbolized as:
( 3 t ) (x) (x 1s a whale ~ x 1s a mammal)
This rendering of (3) makes the argument-place that 1s implicit
in the English sentence explicit.
Dummett's next step, then, 1s to construct sentences
that use relative clauses as second-level predicates. These
predicates are to accept first-level predicative expressions.
The second-level predicates are relative clauses prefixed
with a form of 'to be'. Dummett provides several examples
of sentences whlchare supposedly second-level predicates
completed by first-level pred1cative expressions. I shall
give his analysis of these examples. The first three sentences
are the following:
(4) A poet is what Blake was but Hayley was not
(5) Unhappy is what all Rumanians seem to be
(6) Underpaid is what Peter does not want to be.
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In each of these sentences Dummett says' that the "what"-c1ause
is a second-level predicate. the '1s' represents the relation
or a first-level concept taIling under a second-level concept,
and the expressions 'a poet'. 'unhappy'. and 'underpaid' refer
to first-level concepts. Thus Dummett represents the "what"-
clauses
(4a) 1s what Blake is but Hayley was not
(5a) is what all Rumanians seem to be
(6a) is what Peter does not want to be
as the open sentences
(4b) ~ (Blake) but not t (Hayley)
(Sb) (x) (x 1s a Rumanian ~ it seems that 4» (x»
(6b) Peter does not want to be ~ (Peter)
respectively. (4b)·-(6b) contain argument places that are to
be tilled by first-level predicates. Thus Dummett regards
(4)-(6) as completions or (4b)-(6b).
Sentences (4)-(6) are a bit misleading. Dummett does
not want to say that being a poet is the only property that
Blake and Hayley fail to share, or that being underpaid 1s the
only thing Peter dislikes. The confusion might be lessened
if Dummett had used the word 'something' instead of 'what'.
Thus
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(4*) A poet 1s something Blake was but Hayley was not
(5*) Unhappy is something all Rumanians seem to be
(6*) Underpaid 1s something Peter does not want to be
are clearer than (4)-(6).
Dummett has here attempted to give examples of second-
level predicates that have been constructed according to the
formula he has provided. As we have seen, first-level
quantification 1s not generally adequate for talk about concepts,
for1f our quantifiers range over just objects, then since
objects and concepts are such different sorts of entities, it
1s not surprising that we cannot talk about concepts. So
Dummett concludes that the answer is to use second-level
predication to talk about concepts, functions, and their
properties. Frege has suggested that using "what"-phrases
might be the solution to the problem of talking about concepts
and Dummett has tried to develop Frege's suggestion to use
"what"-clauses pred1catively. We have seen that "what"-
clauses may be used in place of first-level predicates.
Dummett argues that they may also be used for second-level
predication. However, the examples he has supplied do not
essentially involve second-level predication. That 1s, each
of (4)-(6) 1s equivalent to a sentence which only involves
first-level predication and does not contain a "what"-clause.
Sentences (4)-(6) are equivalent to
(4') Blake was a poet but Hayley was not
(5') All Rumanians seem to be unhappy
(6') Peter does not want to be underpaid
respectively. Dummett says that the difference between (4)
and (4') 1s "simply that the former emphasizes that the
sentence is being regarded as the result of fillln~ the
second~level predicate' t (Blake) and not, (Hayley)' by
the first-level predicate'~ was a poet,,,.5
What is gained by regarding (4)-(6) as involving second-
level predication? Dummett's aim 1s to formulate an
appropriate predicate to replace '1s a concept. He chooses:
(C) ... 1s something that everything either is or
1s not.
The gap is to be filled by a first-level predlcative expression.
Dummett represents (C)as the open sentence:
(e') (x) ( , (x) or - ~(x))
where '~' represents the argument place. Thus, he argues
that (C) 1s a second-level predicate, a completion of which
1s:
(7) A horse 1s something that everything either is
or 1s not.
5. Dummett, p. 216 ·
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(7), then, replaces the problematic 'The concept horse 1s a
concept' and may be symbolized as
(7') (x) (x 1s a horse or -x 1s a horse).
But (7') need not be viewed as involving second-level
predication. (7) is just a cumbersome way of saying:
(8) Everything either 1s a horse or 1s not.
Just as with (4)-(6), the relative clause may be eliminated in
favor of stra1ghtfoward first-level predication. If (7) and
(8) are ways of saying that the concept horse is a concept,
then we do not need second-level predication to do so. We
may easily regard (C') as a schema or which (7') 1s an instance.
Rather than regarding ',' as representing an argument place
we may regard ~ as a schematic letter. (7) 1s no more or less
about a concept than (8) is. According to Frege we refer to
concepts by predicates. If one regards (7) as being about a
concept, then he would regard (8) as being about a concept,
too.
The other haU of Dummett's project is to show that his
new terminology provides a way to specify the references of
particular predicates. The example he provides is:
(9) A philosopher is what 'is a philosopher' refers
to.
I assume that Dummett must regard 'a philosopher' as a first-
level predlcative expression and 'is what 'is a philosopher'
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refers to' as a first-level predicate. The '15', then, must
represent the relation of coincidence of extension, and hence
if (9) 1s true, the two expressions are co-re~erential.
However, if we substitute one for the other the result 1s:
(10) What '1s a philosopher' refers to is a
philosopher.
Sentence (10) gives rise to the question, "Which philoso!=ner?"
while Dummett claims that (9) does not.
Dumrnett says that (9) may be expressed more informatively
as:
(11) What 'is a philosopher'refers to is what
Socrates and Plato both were
or
(12) 'Is a philosopher' refers to what Plato and
Socrates both were.
Again, (12) 1s clearer if we substitute 'something' for 'what'.
But (11) and (12) are roundabout ways of saying:
(13) Plato and Socrates were both philosophers
just as
(14) Plato is what 'is a philosopher' refers to
1s a roundabout way of saying
(15) Plato is a philosopher.
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Thus the "what"-clause in (11) and (12) can be eliminated.
A solution to the problem of talking about concepts
and functions might involve the use of second-level predication;
however, Dummett's proposal t~ use "what"-clauses as second-
level predicates fares no better than Frege's sug~estion
to use "what" -phl"ases predlca t i ve ly • All of the examp les
Dummett has provided of sentences wi th second-Ie'vel "t-lhat "-
clauses turn out to be equivalent to sentences that involve
only first-level predication. Even the predicate he offers
as a replacement for '1s a concept' need not be regarded as
being of the second level. What can Dummett think is gained
by what he calls his "reconstructed terminology"? Further-
more, Dummett gives no clue as to how he would handle the
other "unsuitable" predicates such as 'is a function' and
'is unsaturated'. If we are to regard them as illegitimate,
then, unless the predicates are replaced by other language,
we lack the means to express generalities about concepts
and functions.
I have e xamlned Dumrnet t 's proposal to use "what "-c lauses
as second-level predicates and I have found it to be unsatis-
factory for several reasons. First, the examples he provides
of sentences containing occurrences of second-level "what"-
clauses do not essentially involve second-level predication.
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What I mean by this is that in each case the "what"-clause
can be eliminated in favor of first-level predication. Each
of these sentences can be construed as the completion of a
second-level predicate by a first-level predicate, but it need
not be. Second. sentences contain1n~ an occurrence of Dummett's
replacement for the unsuitable 'is a concept' can be construed
as first-order sentences. In fact, one could argue that
it 1s more natural to do so. Finally. Dumrnett's view of the
problem is far too narrow. He sees the problem primarily
as a problem with the specification of the references of
predicates. yet the specification problem is ~erely one
symptom of a more general problem. A critical symptom of
the problem 1s that we seem to be unable to state grammatically
generalities about concepts and functions. The result 1s
that there seems to be no way to formulate the general
metaphysical doctrines of Frege's theory. Du~nett does not
appear to recognize this and his analysis neither deals with
this symptom nor does it lend itself to an expansion which
might treat it.
I would like, however. to look more closely at Dummett's
proposal to use "what"-clauses as second-level predicates1n
an attempt to determine what Dummett believes he has gained
by their introduction. Durnmett 1s aware that the examples he
discusses can be paraphrased so to eliminate second-level
predication, for he writes:
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The difference between the form 'A poet is what Blake
was but Hayley was not' and the simpler 'Blake was a
poet and Hayley was not' is thus simply that the
former emohas1zes that the sentence 15 bein~ re~arded
as the fli11ng of the second-level predicate '~(Blake)
and not ~ (Hayley)' by the first-level predicate '~
is a poet'.6 .
Frege does hold that sentences admit various readln~s. In
"On Concept and ObJect" he states:
••. a thought can be split up 1n many ways so that
now one thing J now another. appears as subject and
predicate ... lt need not then surprise us that the
same sentence may be conceived as an assertion
about a concept and also about an object; only we
must observe that what 1s asserted 1s different. 7
Thus while I do not wish to argue with Dumrnett on the point
that sentences (4)-(6) can be viewed as second-
level predicates completed by first-level predicates, it 1s
important to ask: What do we gain by doing so and what role
do the "what"-clauses play? I think that this question can
be, at least partially, answered by an examination of a
passage from the Begriffsschr1ft. Frege says there:
Since the sign ~ occurs in the expression ~(A)
and since we can imagine 'that 1t is replaced by
other signs ~ and XJ which would express other
"6. Ibid.
7. Geach and Black, p. 49·
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functions of the argument A, we can aSso regard
,(A) as a function of the argument ~.
A little later, in a section on generality, Frege says:
In the expression of a jUd~ment we can always regard
the combination of signs to the r1~ht of ~ as a
function of the signs occurring in it. If we replace
this argument by a German letter and if in the content
stro~e we introduce a concavity with this German
letter in it, as in
This stands for the judgment that whatever we may
take for its argument, the function is a fact. Since
a letter used as a sign for a function such as ~ in
,CA), can itself be regarded as the argument of a
function, its place can be taken, in the manner just
specified by a German letter. 9
Frege's position can best be understood by considering a
particular sentence, say,
(1) Socrates 1s a philosopher.
According to Frege, (1) can be regarded in two different ways,
and depending upon how it is regarded it will lead to
different generalizations. First, the sentence can be seen
as the completion of a first-level ·predicate by a proper name.
tt8. Jean van Heijenoort, ed., From Fre~e to Godel: A Source
Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931Cambr1dge: Harvard
University Press, 1967), p. 24.
9. Ibid.
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The predicate is 'is a philosopher' and the proper name is
'Socrates'. In this case Socrates is the argument. The
sentence, then, 1s taken to be a completion of the open
sentence
x is a philosopher
whe~e 'Socrates' fills the argument place. Viewed in this
way the sentence leads to the existential generalization
(2) (~x) (x 1s a philosopher),
that ls, something 1s a philosopher, or there 1s something
that falls under the concept philosopher.
Frege maintains that an alternative way of regarding
sentence (1) is to take the concept as the argument. He
says that the concept may be viewed as the argument because
we can Ima~lne its name replaced by other signs, say '1s
wise' or '1s a man'. Taken in this way the sentence is seen
as a completion of the open sentence.
Socrates F
where '1s a philosopher' fills the argument place. On this
view, the sentence leads to the existential generalization
(3) (~F) (Socrates F).
The English translation of (3) might be 'Socrates is something'
or 'There is some concept under which Socrates falls'. There
are some problems with finding a suitable translation in
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natural :anguage, but I will return to this point later.
Thus Frege maintains that the sentence may be regarded
in either way, and, depending upon what 1s taken to be the
argument, the sentence will lead to different generalizations.
While the first reading of sentence (1) leads to a standard
and uncontrovers1al existential quantification, the second
leads to what 15 called a "second-order" quantification.
Although Frege does not question the use of a second-ord~r
quantification, its use 1s controversial.
Given Frege's view that a sentence such as (1) may be
regarded either as being about an object or about a concept,
it 1s a bit clearer what Dummett intends the introduction of
"what"-clauses to accomplish. While 'A poet 1s what Blake was
but Hayley was not' merely means 'Blake was a poet and Hayley
was not', the former is phrased so as to indicate that the
concept poet 1s to be taken as the argument. Thus the sentence
1s viewed as the completion of a second-level predicate by a
first-level predicate. In other words, the former is to be
viewed as a completion of the open sentence
F(Blake) and not F(Hayley)
where 'F' 1s not viewed as a schematic letter but rather as
a quantifiable variable. Thus this form leads us to the
existential generalization
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(~F) (F(Blake) and not F(Hayley)).
This form of the sentence emphasizes that the concept poet
1s taken to be the argument. That Is, the sentence 1s about
the concept. The simpler form, 'Blake was a poet and Hayley
was not', does not have this emphasis.
But I believe that Dummett's "what"-phrases accomplish
no more than providing emphasis. Sentences containing
occurrences of "what"-clauses are merely stylistic variations
of equivalent sentences without them. We did not have
to rephrase sentence (1) as
(4) A philosopher is what Socrates is
in order to view the sentence as being about a concept. For
Frege, (3) 15 as direct a generalization of (1) as (2) is.
We do not have to mediate the transition to (3) by first
rephrasing (1) as (4). Thus while Dumrnett may have provided
a way to emphasize the considerations involved in moves like
the one from (1) to (3) the emphasis provided by the use of
"what"-clauses 1s certainly not necessary. According to Frege
the simpler sentence 'Blake was a poet and Hayley was not'
implies the existential generalization no less than the
complicated form does. Emphasis is the only thing that
recommen~one form over another. On Frege's view, predicates
refer to concepts and can be regarded as names of arguments.
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We may regard sentence (1) as having the concept ph11osooher
as sUbject without moving the pred1catlve expression 'a
philosopher' into the grammatical subject position.
Before I continue my examination of Dumrnett's analysis
I think that it would be instructive to take a brief look at
the controversy concerning the use of second-order quantifi-
cation. My purpose is not to question the legitimacy of its
use, but rather to examine the controversy in order to gain
some insight into the implications of and the underlying
assumptions involved in the use of second-order quantification.
In particular it would be useful to look as W.V. Quine's
objections to second-order quantification.
What I mean by "second-order" quantification is
quantification involving predicate variables. The controversy
is over whether predicate positions are accessible to
quantified variables. Predicate variables are generally
taken to range over attributes or properties. Quine's position
is that while the move from sentence (1) to sentence (2)
is a legitimate one, the move from (1) to (3) is not. The
lattep move involves viewing the predicate as being 1n a
position that is accessible to a quantified variable. For
Frege the move from (1) to (3) is made for exactly the same
considerations as the move from (1) to (2). If we view the
concept philosopher as argument, generalization yields (3).
Quine's objections to second-order quanitification are
made on gralmnatlcal grounds. According to Quine, substituting
a quantifiable variable for an expression 1s tantamount to
taking that expression to be a name, that 1s to assuming that
it has a reference. I am not interested here in questlonln~
the existence of Fregean concepts. Rather, I am interested
in the role that second-order quantification plays 1n Frege's
theory and in the grarnmaticality of second-order existence
claims.
In Philosophy of Logic Quine argues that only names can
stand in place of a variable in an open sentence and that
predicates are not names. Hence, we should not use predicate
letters as variables. Quine points out that some phl1oso9hers
who use second-order quantification do so out of confusion
between use and mention. The confused second-order logician
takes the quantifiers '(3F)' and '(F)' to range over predicate
expressions rather than over those entities that predicates
name, if predicates name anything at all. However, ?re~e,
whom Quine calls the "prodigal logician", considers predicates
to be names; they name concepts. Frege takes '(3F)' and '(F)'
to range over concepts and functions and accordingly, they
are read as 'There is a concept such that ... ' and 'All concepts
are such that ... '.
Later Quine argues that these entities over which
second-order quantifiers are taken to range cannot be adequately
individuated. The quantifiers t(~F)' and '(F)' range over
attributes and properties and while sets are individuated by
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the law of extensionality, this is not so for attributes and
properties. He claims "open sentences never determine two
sets, but may determine two attributes".lO This is not true,
though, of Fregean concepts. Concepts are, indeed, individuated
by a law of extensionality. Identity 1s a relation that may
hold only between objectsj however, there is an analogous
~elat1on that may hold ~etween concepts. We say that conce~t
A 1s the same as concept B if and only if every object that
falls under A falls unde~ B, and every object that falls under
B falls under A. That 1s, two concepts are the same if and
only if their extensions are identical. Two predicate
expressions may refer to the same concept yet differ in
sense. Thus Frege 1s not injured by Quine's objections so
far. For Frege, pred1catesare names, in Quine's sense.
In Methods of Logic Quine distinguishes between concrete
and abstract terms and singular and general terms. He says:
Those who draw a distinction between classes and
attributes will see in 'humanity' a name of an
attribute and in 'mankind' a name of a class, the
class of all objects that partake of the attribute
humanity. Both terms are abstract singular terms
as opposed to the concrete general term 'man' or
'human'. This general. term has the class mankind
as its extension.!!
10. W.V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 67.
11. W.V. Q~1ne, Methods of Logic, 3rd ed., (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1950), p. 218.
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Although Frege does not explicitly draw these distinctions,
any singular term, whether it be concrete or abstract, counts
as a Fregean proper name. What Quine calls a "general term"
1s what I have called a "concept name". A difference between
Quine and Frege 1s that while Frege considers concept words or
predicates to be names, Quine does not. Quine argues that
singular terms occur in positions that are accessible to
variables while general terms do not. We have seen that
Frege considers both proper names and predicates to be referring
expressions, and hence either can be replaced by a variable.
Quine's position is that since predicates do not refer to one
thing at a time in the way that singular terms do, we cannot
make sense of open sentences such as
Socrates 1s an x
or
All x are mortal
and therefore it is improper to imbed such open sentences in
quantifications. Quine suggests that such open sentences be
rephrased in terms of class membership, where the variable of
the open sentence stands in place of an abstract singular
term. For 1nst~nce, in the open sentence
Socrates is a member of x
'x t is in a position accessible to the abstract singular term
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'mankind' or 'the class of philosophers'. Quine insists,
however, that the predicate letter 'F' just 1s not a variable,
but rather a schematic letter. If the values of 'F' are
taken to be classes or sets, then Quine urges switching over to
the language of set theory, for otherwise what 1s being said
is obscured. If one wants to admit classes as values for
variables of quantification, he should write 'x£y' rather than
'Fx'.
The major point of disagreement between Quine and Frege
is on the syntactic and semantic role of the predicate.
Frege views predicates as referring expressions and Quine
does not. For Frege, predicates do occ~r in "name" positions,
and they name concepts. A predicate 1s not a singular term
but it does refer to one thing at a time. For Quine,
predicates attach to singular terms and yield truths and
falsehoods. Frege wants to quantify over those entities over
which second-order quantifiers range, while Quine denies their
existence.' Indeed, in order for Frege to formulate his
doctrines about concepts and functions he needs the machinery
that will allow him to quantify over them. Rephrasing
sentences in terms of class membership is not adequate for
Fregej class names are Fregean proper names and hence refer
to objects rather than concepts. No singular term, or proper
name, refers to a concept.
Dummettts attempt to resolve the problem of specifying
the reference of a given predicate 1s a digression from his
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discussion of Frege's ascription of reference to predicates.
On page 245 of his book Frege: The Philosophy of Language,
Dummett states:
There can be no reservation whatever about the
existence of concepts, relations, and functions
provided that we are prepared to admit second-
level quantification.
This is the conclusion he reaches after examining Frege's
thesis that incomplete expressions have reference. For the time
quantification nor with the question of whether concepts
exist. Instead I am concerned with whether there 1s a solution
to the problem of talking about concepts; for if the theory
bars us from talking about concepts, the theory is rendered
untenable. Dummett believes that the answer 1s to be found
in the relation between Frege's thesis that incomplete
expressions refer and second-order quantification. When
Dummett returns to the scrutiny of Frege's thesis that
predicates have reference, he begins by analyzing the ascription
of reference to a particular predicate. The example he
chooses 1s:
(5) There 1s something that 'is a philosopher' refers
to.
Dummett claims that if second-order quantification is
accepted as legitimate then (5) is true. He argues as follows.
He points out that 'something' in (5) must be construed as
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a second-order quantifier since 'is a philosopher' does not
refer to any object. Thus, Dummett continues, (5) 1s
equivalent to
(6) There is such a thing as what 'is a philosopher'
refers to,
where the "what"-claus~ in (6) is a predicate that refers to
a concept. He then argues that (6) merely means
(7) There 1s such a thing as being a philosopher.
He goes on to say that (7) "must be admitted as both
intelligible and true by anyone who allows any form of second-
level quantification.,,12 Henc~, since (7) is equivalent to
(5), Dummett concludes, (5) is true provided that second-order
quantification is accepted as legitimate. Later he draws the
following conclusion from this argument:
We have reduced the assertion that a given predicate
has a reference to a banality exactly parallel to
that to which the ascription of a reference to a
proper name amounts. 13
I should explain that Dummett maintains that to ascribe a
reference to a given proper name, say 'Mount Everest', 1s
to affirm
12. Durnmett, p. 218.
13. Dumrnett, p. 222.
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(8) There 1s such a thing as Mount Everest.
Analogously, to ascribe a reference to the predicate '1s a
philosopher' is to affirm (7).
Before I continue to discuss Dumrnett's views on the
relation between second-order quantification and Frege's
thesis that predicates refer, I would like to take a closer
look at the argument I have Just outlined. I believe that
Dummett 1s correct in saying that 'something' in (5) must be
construed as a second-order quantifier, for, according to
Frege, no predicate refers to any object, and first-order
quantifiers range over objects. However, consider (6).
Dummett has previously argued that any "what"-clause of the
form r what ~ refers to' ,where ~ is a predicate, is
"completely interchangeable" with~. I take it that by
"completely interchangeable" Dummett means su tstltutable
preserving grammaticality as well as truth. Accordingly,
(6) should be equivalent to
(6') There is such a thing as is a philosopher
However, (6') 1s ungrammatical. If the copula is dropped
from the predicate '1s a philosopher' the result,
(6") There 1s such a thing as a philosopher,
is grammatical. However, (6") affirms the existence of at·
least one philosopher, not of a concept. It says that the
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concept philosopher is not empty. This 1s not the same
thing as asserting the existence of a concept, for, according
to Frege J there are empty concepts. Thus if we leave cut the
copula the result 1s grammatical but is equivalent to the
first-order sentence '(3x) (x Is a philosopher)'. If we
leave in the copula, the result, (6') is ungrammatical. Thus
if we accept Dumrnett' s principle of sUbstitutl~lity for "1~hat"­
clauses and if the "what"-clause in (6) 1s a predicate, then
(6) is also ungrammatical. Yet (6) certainly appears to be
grammatical. It seems, then, that Dummett 1s using 'what
'1s a philosopher' refers to' as a proper name in (6) and not
as a predicate. As I have noted before, such "what"-clauses
are ambiguous. They may occur either as proper names or as
predicates. Consider, now:
(a) There 1s such a thing as
While Dummett claims that some completiomof (a) are second-
order sentences (a) has the peculiar feature that any
grammatical completion of it 1s a first-order sentence. That
is, the blank in (a) 1s grammatically accessible only to
proper names. Thus it is a problem for Frege, and Dummett,
to make second-order existence claims, and hence to express
grammatically the existence of concepts and functions. Now
consider (7). If (7) 1s grammatical, 'being a philosopher'
must be a proper name. Yet if it is a proper name, (7) is not
equivalent to the ascription of a reference to the predicate
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'1s a philosopher'.
Where has Dummett gone wrong? After having so carefully
analyzed the problems associated with the predicate '1s a
concept', he does not appear to realize that a similar problem
is associated with (a). It is helpful here to invoke
Quine's distinctions between concrete and abstract terms
and singular and general terms. Dummett seems to be claiming
that each of '1s a pnilosopher', 'being a philosopher', and
'what '1s a philosopher' refers to' 1s coreferent1al, and
hence interchangeable, with the others. Yet they are not all
interchangeable with one another. To use Quine's terminology.
'is a philosopher' and 'a philosopher' are concrete general
terms, while 'being a philosopher' 1s an abstract singular
term. The expression 'what 'is a philosopher' refers to'
1s ambiguous and may occur either as a concrete general term
or as an abstract singular term. With this in mind, we can
see that in (6) the "what"-clause occurs as an abstract
singular term, and (7) is the completion of (a) by the
abstract singular term 'being a philosopher'. Hence if (6)
and (7) assert the existence of anything, they assert the
existence of an abstract object and not a concept.
Again, (a) may be grammatically completed only with a
singular term, abstract or concrete, and no singular term
refers to any concept or function. I consider this feature
of (a) to be yet another symptom of the general problem
of talking about concepts. While Frege needs second-order
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quantification to make existential claims about concepts and
functions, the ·quantifier (a) is not an adequate one.
So far Dummett has argued that the ascription of
reference to a particular predicate 1s a banality provided
that we admit second-order quantification. However, the
argument breaks down due to our inability to talk about
concepts other than by using predicates, or what Quine calls
"general terms". Dummett also provides a general argument,
the conclusion of which 1s:
... the existence of concepts -- that is, of referents
for predicates -- required for its proper expression,
the use of second-level quantification, and was beyond
doubt provided that the employment of that ~evice
is allowed as legitimate and Intel11g1ble. 1
Dummett's argument 1s as follows. If we can substitute
a variable for an expression then that expression refers.
To say that predicates refer 1s to say that concepts exist.
Thus if we can substitute variables for predicates, concepts
exist. Substituting variables for predicates 1s using
second-order quantification. Therefore, Dummett concludes,
concepts exist provided that we admit second-order quantification.
I wish to argue, however, that we can accept second-order
quantification as legitimate without accepting the existence
of Fregean concepts.
As we have seen, Frege does not question the legitimacy
14. Dummett, p. 223.
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of second-order quantification; he uses it freely. H~wever,
a second-order theory adequate for Frege must differ significantly
from a standard second-order theory of the sort suggested by
Quine. In standard second-order theories two types of
variables are used: first-order and second-order variables.
First-order variables range over objects and second-order
variables range oVer all subsets of the range of ~lrst-order
variables. Such a theory would not be adequate for Frege,
for according to Frege, concept and function variables must
range over incomplete entities, not extensions or any other
sort of object. Thus Frege's second-order theory cannot be
a set theory.
Hence while Dummett may be correct in saying that the
acceptance of Frege's thesis that predicates refer to concepts
requires the acceptance of some theory of second-order
quantification, he has not talked at all about what theory of
second-order quantification he has in mind. Certainly in order
for that theory to accommodate the peculiarities or Frege's
theory of concepts and functions it must be appropriately
"non-standard". In the process of examining Dummett's
analysis I have discovered another serious symptom of the
problem. It is clear that Frege needs a second-order quantifier
in natural language in order to express the existence of
concepts. However, the natural language quantifier (a)
will accept only proper names. Again we are in a position
where we are forced to use proper names to talk about concepts.
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If we attempt to complete (a) with an incomplete expression,
the result is rendered incomplete itself. We have seen that
Dummett does not discuss the difficulties that exist, for
Frege, in making particular second-order existence claims.
The use of standard second-order quantification theory will
give rise to similar problems.
Thus not only must the language be extended in an
appropriate way so that we may talk about concepts and
functions, but also a non-standard second-order theory 1s
required to accommodate Frege's doctrines about concepts and
objects. If Dummett is correct about the relation between
Frege's thesis that incomplete expressions have reference and
second-order quantification, then these are not separate
projects.
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3. Martin's solution
In his paper "3"rege's Problems with 'The Concept Horse,,,l
Edwin Martin examines a problem associated with Frege's thesis
that predicates refer to concepts, and proposes a solution.
Martin sees the proble~ as a problem with the specification
of referencesof predicates. While Frege maintains that
predicates refer to, or stand for, concepts, we are prevented,
by Frege's theory, from truthfully completing
(1) , E; 1s a horse' stands for
No matter what expression is put in the blank of (1) the
result will not be a true sentence. The blank of (1) 1s
grammatically accessible only to proper names, yet if (1)
is completed with a proper name, the result 1s false. Proper
names refer to objects and no predicate refers to any object.
On the other hand, if we attempt to complete (1) with an
incomplete expression, the result inherits the incompleteness
of that expression and hence is rendered ungrammatical. There
1s no corresponding problem with the specification of
reference for proper names.
1. Edwin Mart in Jr., '~Frege' s Pro blems wi th '!'he Concept Horse'"
Critlca (Mexico), 5 (September 1971): 45-61. '
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Martin approaches the problem by examining the relation
referred to by 'stands for' in (1). He compares it to the
relation that holds between a proper name and its reference.
Are the two relations the same? His answer is that technically
they are not. The relation that obtains between 'is a horse'
and its reference 1s of the second level because it holds
between a predicate and a first-level function. The relation
that obtains between 'Socrates' and Socrates 1s of the first
level because it holds between a proper name and an object.
Martin's approach to the problem with (1) is reminiscent of
Dummett's treatment of the problem with the predicate 'is
a concept'. Remember that the predicate 'is a concept' cannot
be completed truthfully because it will accept grammatically
only proper names and no proper name refers to'aconcept.
If we attempt to complete the predicate with an incomplete
expression, the result is rendered incomplete. Dummett's
strategy was to construct a suitable second-level replacement
for the first-level predicate '1s a concept'.
Martin's strategy in the case of the relation referred
to by 'stands for' in (1) 1s similar to Dummett's. Martin
argues that the name for that relation must be a second~level
function name, for the relation take a predicate and a
first~level function to a truth value. However, whatever that
relation may be, it cannot be adequately schemat1zed as
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(2) St(' t 1s a horse', ~( ))
for any instance of (2) contains a gap that it inherits from
the first-level function name substituted for '~( )' and hence
cannot refer to a truth value.
Martin asks if this problem 1s associated with all
second-level function names. The argument place of a second-
level function name 1s filled with a first~level function
name. Yet a first-level function name must be incomplete.
We cannot represent the rorm of a second-level function name
as
(3) M(~( ))
for (3) is rendered incomplete by the first-level function
name ',< )'. Frege's most orten used example of a second-
level function name, Martin notes, is the universal quantifier.
When we apply the universal quantifier to a first-level
function name the resulting expression does not have the
incompleteness that (3) does. The universal quantifier
(4) \:Ix ~(x)
carries bound variables. The bound variables of the universal
quantifier fill the argument place of the first-level function
name '~( )'. The argument place of the quantifier is in
turn filled by the first-level function name. A mesh is
achieved when the quantifier is completed by a function name
of the appropriate type.
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Martin uses the universal quantifier as a model in
constructing an appropriate representation of the second-
level reference relation. His insight 1s that the problem
associated with (2) and (3) 1s dissolved in the case of
the universal quantifier by having the argument place of
the first-level function name filled by a bound variable
carried by the second-level function name. What Martin 1s
attempting to construct is a representation of the logical
form of a suitable second-level function name for the second-
level reference relation. What he provides 1s:
(5) St x('~ 1s a horse', ~(x)).
What Martin intends is a second-level function name with a bound
variable that fills the gap of the first-level function
name. (5) 1s, of course, an abbreviation. The form of the name
for the reference relation for predicates should not be
represented by (2) but rather by (5).
Martin anticipates an objection to the use of bound
variables in (5). The objection 1s that his solution 1s
ad hoc. He answers the objection by arguing that the use of
bound variables is as appropriate in (5) as it is in the case
of the universal quantifier. While it may not be evident
that bound variables are needed in (5), bound variables are
needed in those cases when the first-level function 1s
polyad1c. In those cases the bound variables serve the
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same purpose they serv~ in complex quantifications. Consider,
for example
(6) ~ x 2 Y Fxy.
The bound variables in (6) keep track of references. We need
some way to indicate that the universal quantifier binds
the first argument-place and that the existential quantifier
binds the second argument-place of the function. Now
consider the reference relation applied to a binary function
name, as in:
(7 ) St x,y ('~ 1s Digger then ~ , , ~(x,y)) •
It should be clear that (7) differs in meaning from
(8 ) St x,y ('t 1s bigger than ~ , , tP(y,x».
Thus Martin maintains that (1) should have the form of
(5) and should be completed as in
(9) St xC'; 1s a horse', x 1s a horse).
The result 1s a true sentence. In order to avoid the problem
with (2), the logical form of the specification of reference
for predicates must be something like (5). That 1s,the
relation of reference for predicates must be a second-level
function and its name must have a gap that accommodates a
first-level function name yet also provide a bound variable
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to fill the gap of the first-level function name.
Martin has n8t told us what relation this second-level
relation is. He has merely given us an abbreviation for the
logical form of something that is suitable, in light of Frege's
theory. What, then. 1s a likely candidate for something that
has the form of (S)? The following has the appropriate
form:
(10) ('Ix) ('t 1s a horse' 1s true of x = , (x))
where '~(x)' 1s a first-level function name. It carries a
bound variable that fills the argument-place of the f1rst-
level function name. Similarly the following has the form
of (7):
(11) ('Ix) ('1y) ('~ 1s bigger than ~' 1s true of
<X,Y> = til (x,y)
The following, then, would be the specifications of the
references of '1s a horse' and '1s bigger than', respectively:
(12) (Vx) ('~ is a horse' 1s true of x = x 1s a horse)
and
(13) (\fx) (Vy) ('~ is bigger than ~' is true of
<x,y> = X is bigger than y)
Sentences (12) and (13) do not have the problem associated
with (1) and (2), but do they really specify the references of
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the expressions '1s a horse' and '1s bigger than'? I believe
not. It this is the complex second-level function that Martin
takes (5) to represent. then little progress has been made
toward a solution to the problem. It seems that he has replaced
the notion or reference for predicates by the notion at a
predicate being true or an object. The relation ot being
true of 1s a relation that holds\~between a predicate and an
object. According to Frege. a predicate 1s true of an object
J~st in case that object falls under the concept to which
the predicate refers. Thus to define 'is true of' we need
the notion or reference tor predicates. It appears that
Martin holds that the reference relation tor predicates 1s
different from ~he reference relation tor proper names. He
says "Presumably there 1s an unproblematic relation holding
between proper names and their bearers. The situation here
perhaps may be pictures as: St ('Aristotle', Aristotle).,,2
What 1s the reference relation for predicates and how
does it difter, if at all. trom the reference relation for
proper names? The relation that holds between predlcat~and
their references 1s technically a different relation from
that which holds between proper names and their references.
The difference between the relations is akin to the difference
between the identity relation for objects and the analogous
2. Martin. p. 6L
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relation for concepts. Identity 1s a relation that can only
be asserted or denied as holding between objects; it 1s a
first-level function. Thus, strictly speaking, according to
Frege J we cannot say that concepts are identical. However,
the analogous relation of sameness for concepts 1s very much
like identity. When we say that two objects are identical
we mean that they are indistinguishable. When we say that
two concepts are the same we mean that they are indistinguishable.
Similarly, the relation of reference that holds between
proper names and objects is a different relation from the
relation that holds between predicates and concepts. The
former is a first-level function and the latter 1s a second-
level function. The two relations can indeed be distinguished,
yet Frege talks as if the relations are closely analogous,
if not the same. Frege talks as if he intends a "generic"
relation of identity and a "generic" relation of reference.
There is a technical difference between identity for objects
and identity for concepts imposed by Frege's hierarchy of
objects and functionsj however, both relations are, in a
sense, the relation of identity. Similarly, there 1s a
technical difference between reference for proper names and
reference for predicates, yet they are, in a sense, both
the reference relation.
It should be noted that if the two reference relations
are different, then there must be an infinite number of
reference relations corresponding to the infinite hierarchy
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of levels of functions. Yet it should be clear that ~rege does
not intend any significant or interesting difference between
the relation that obtains between a first-level predicate and a
first-level concept and the relation that obtains between a
second-level predicate and a second level concept. The difference
between these relations 1s merely a technical one dictated by the
:heory of syntax. I maintain that the d1~rerence between
the reference relation for proper names and the reference
relation for predicates 1s a similar difference. According to
~regeJ j~st as proper names refer, so do predicates. To reduce
the second-level referen~e relation to the relation of a
predicate being true of an object 1s to weaken Frege's theory.
If (10) is not what Martin has in mind as the relation
represented by (5), then it 1s not at all clear what Martin
intends.
After Martin introduced (5) as a representation of the
second-level reference relation, he goes on to say:
And other higher-level function names -- like 'is a
(first-level) concept' -~ also carry along with them
bound variables. Thus:
FCx (x is a horse).3
Martin has given a representation of the logical form of a
second-level predicate to replace the unsuitable first-level
predicate 'is a concept'. Dummett's suggestion for a suitable
replacement has the appropriate form. Remember that Dummett
suggests
(14) (Vx) (x 1s a horse or - x is a horse).
3. Martin, p. 60.
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Sentence (14) is a completion of the second-level function
name
(15 ) (V x) (f ( x) or - ~ ( X) ) •
by the first-level predicate '1s a horse'. Again, Martin's
insight that second-level function names should carry bound
variables to fill the argument places of first-level ~unct1on
names resembles Dummett's. Yet Dummett's proposal turned
out to be 1naaequate because it could not treat other related
problems with Frege's philosophy of language. Martin's
proposal 1s similarly inadequate. How can we deny that
Socrates 1s a first-level concept or that any ~lven concept
1s an object?
Given Frege's theory, it 1s clear that a first-level
predicate is required to assert grammatically of any entity
that it is an object. The predicate 'is an object' does the
job. It is accessible to proper names and proper names refer
to objects. However, it 1s not the case, according to
Frege, that everything is an object. That 1s, one might be
tempted to express what Frege wants to deny as:
( 16 ) (" x ) (x 1s an 0 bj ec t ) .
Thus he wants to affirm:
(17) (:ax) - (x is an object).
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However, Frege is prevented from saying truthfully or any
entity that it fails to be an object. Any grammatical
instantiation or (17) is false. Consider the open sentence:
(18) - x 1s an object.
The variable 1s in a position that 1s accessible only to
proper names, and hence any grammatical substitution w11l
yield a falsehood. Given that 'is an object' is a t1rst-
level predicate, it cannot be completedwith any expression
other than a proper name. In particular we cannot deny that
any first-level concept 1s an object. The best we can do,
given an appropriate second-level replacement for '1s a
concept', 1s affirm both the existence or objects and concepts.
Thus:
(19) (b) (x 1s an object) & (~,) ('Ix) (,(x) " - t(x»).
Yet we still lack the means for expressing Frege's doctrine
that no concept 1s an object. That we are unable to complete
(18) truthfully is only part or the problem. It 1s clear
that Frege cannot express the doctrine in question as:
(20) ('Ix) (x is a concept ~ - x is an object)
As we have seen. (18), which occurs in (20), cannot be
truthfully completed. Also, '1s a concept' is a first-level
predicate and hence must be replaced by a suitable second~
level predicate. But then attempts to make comparisons between
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objects and concepts are blocked. If we can truthfully
say of an entity that it 1s a concept then the name of that
entity 1s of the first level. A first-level expression cannot
grammatically complete the first-level predicate '1s an object',
and hence we cannot deny that that entity 1s an object.
Furthermore, generalization on a first-level name requires
second-order quantification. Thus (20), which is a f1rst-
order quantification, 1s not adequate.
We need a second-level predicate to affirm that any
entity is a concept, but we need a first-level predicate to
deny that that entity 1s an object. Yet second-level
predicates are accessible only to first-level expressions and
flrst-level-predlcates are accessible only to proper names.
Thus it seems that we need both a proper name and a f1rst-
level predicate to name this entity. But this 1s just what
Frege says cannot be done. There are many metaphysical
doctrines that Frege wants to affirm yet 1s barred from
expression grammatically. For any n, Frege has no way of
saying that nth-level functions are distinct from (n+l)st_
level functions and that not everything is of the nth level.
The situation looks hopeless. If Frege's theory is true it
cannot be expressed.
Martin's proposal 1s an enlightening one but, in the
end, does not bring us any closer to a solution. The idea of
constructing second-level function names on the model of the
universal quantifier is interesting. However, it has several
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defects. While the representation Martin gives us of an
appropriate form for the name for the second-level reference
relation does succeed in avoiding the problems associated
with the open sentence:
'Is a horse' refers to
Martin has not told us what relation he has in mind. The
candidate I have considered 1s not adequate. While the name
for the second-level reference relation must be of the
second level and the name for the first-level reference
relation must be of the first level, I believe that Frege
intends the two relations to be more intimately related than
Martin proposes. Furthermore the situation is still graver
than is suggested by Martin's treatment. Even if we can find
an adequate name for the relation that obtains between a
predicate and its reference, and thereby solve the "problem
with 'the concept horse''', there are further problems with
Frege's philosophy of language. Frege's theory prevents
us from expressing its metaphysical doctrines. While the
problem with specifying the references of predicates 1s a
serious one for Frega, it 1s merely one symptom of a theory
in trouble. Any adequate treatment of the problem of
talking about concepts and functions must take care of the
related problems I have discussed as well as the specification
problem.
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4. Furth's solution
In his paper "Two Types of Denotation"l Montgomery Furth
examines Frege's doctr1~e that incomplete expressions have
reference and attempts to construct a modification of that
doctrine that avoids the associated pr~blems. He maintains
that while there are problems with the doctrine, the problems
can be solved and a version of the doctrine saved.
According to Frege, expressions can be divided into
those that are complete and those that are incomplete.
Expressions in both categories have reference, or are names.
Complete expressions, or proper names, refer to objects and
incomplete expressions refer to functions. The distinction
between function and object is an important one for Frege,
yet when attempting to explain the distinction he appeals
to metaphors. He draws the distinction in terms of being
"saturated" or "complete" and "unsaturated" or "in need of
completion". Such metaphorical talk is unsatisfactory. We
have seen that Frege's notion of a function 1s an obscure
one. While the notion of incompleteness as applied ~o
expression can be understood in terms of an expression
containing a gap or argument place, Frege talks as if the
references of these expressions have a corresponding
incompleteness or unsaturatedness. A function is not an
object yet it yields an objec-t when "saturated" by an
1. Montgomery Furth, "Two Types of Denotation", Studies in
Log,ical Theor* APQ Monograph Series No.2 (Oxford: BasIl
Blackwell, 19 8), pp. 9-45.
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object. This is all figurative and rather obscure. The
metaphors Frege offers by way of an explanation of what it
1s for an entity to be unsaturuated or in need of completion
are not enlightening. For instance:
Metaphorical expressions, if used cautiously,
may after all help towards an elucidation. I
compare that which needs completion to a
wrapping, e.g. a coat, which cannot stand
upright by itself; 1n order to do that, it must
be wrapped round somebody. The man whom it is
wrapped round may put on another wrapping e.g.
a cloak. The two wrapp1n~s unite to form a
single wrapping. There are thus two possible
ways of looking at the matter; we may say either
that a man who already wore a coat was now dressed
in a second wrapping, a cloak, or that his c~othing
consists of two wrappings -- coat and cloak.
In addition to the obscurity of the distinction 1n the
realm of reference between saturated and unsaturated, Furth
1s concerned with other problems associated with Frege's
doctrine that incomplete expressions have reference. He is
particularly concerned with the problem that arises when we
attempt to specify the reference of a given incomplete
expression. He states the problem in the following way. In
the case of a proper name, or complete expression, A, we can
ascribe and specify reference using the forms:
(I) (:3:x) (A refers to x)
(II) A refers to x
2. Geach and Black, p. 134.
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where (I) ascribes reference to A and (II) specifies the
reference of A. We cannot, however, use forms (I) and (II)
where A 1s an incomplete expression. We cannot truthfully
complete
(1) 'F()' refers to
for if we fill the blank of (1) with a complete expression the
result 1s false and if we fill the blank of (1) with an
incomplete expression the result 1s not a sentence and hence
is neither true nor false. Thus while Frege maintains that
incomplete expressions have reference, his doctrine is
shrouded in obscurity and gives rise to the problem with
specification.
Furth asks: what does it mean to say that incomplete
expressions have reference? In an attempt to answer this
question he first reformulates Frege's doctrine. Furth
holds that Frege's doctrine of "unsaturated" reference for
incomplete expressions consists of two different theses.
First, incomplete expressions do not refer to objects and
second, incomplete expressions do have reference. Before
defining 'incomplete expression', Furth distinguishes between
simple and complex proper names. A complex proper name is
a proper name that has a proper name as proper part. For
instance, 'Massachusetts' and '2' are simple proper names
while 'the capital of Massachusetts' and '2+3' are complex
proper names. Sentences are, according to Frege, complex
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proper names. Incomplete expressions, then. result from
removing one or more proper names from a complex proper name.
Thus. 'the capital or ( )', I( )+3'. and '( ) 1s a horse' are
incomplete expressions. Although proper names. as a clas8.
"have reference" and reter to objects, some proper names
reter and some tail to reter. For example, 'Pegasus' and
'the largest prime number' are proper names but they tail
to reter. Frege holds that if a complex proper name contains
a part that lacks reference then the whole lacks reference.
Accordingly. 'Pegasus is a horse' 1s neither true nor false.
Furth takes the tact that the reference of an incomplete
expression cannot be specified using the specification form
for proper names as evidence that incomplete expressions do
not have reference "in isolation"; that is, if they do have
reference they do so in the context or a complex proper
name. Hence. his reformulation or Frege's doctrine 1s put
in ter~s of referring complex proper names. His formulation
is as follows:
, (ft) A referring complex proper name must contain
at least one incomplete part whlah (i) does
not refer to an object, but (li) does have
reference.
Furth's aim 1s to establish (R) and to that end he discusses
(1) a.~ (11) separately.
In support of (1), Furth argues that in every complex
proper name that refers. there must be a part that plays a
semant1cal role that 1s different from that of referring to
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an object. A referring complex proper nam~ refers to a
unique object. An enumeration or list of the references of
its complete parts does not suffice as a semantic account of
that complex proper name, for the reference of a complex
proper name may be distinct from the references of its complete
constituents. Consider, for example, the complex proper name,
'2+3'. Supposing that '2' and '3' exhaust its complete
parts, there 1s "something else" that, within the complex
name '2+3', combines the references of '2' and '3' so that
the complex name refers to five. Furth argues that the
incomplete expression that remains when the complete parts are
removed plays a semantical role in yielding the reference,
five. His account of this is that the complete parts of a
complex proper name refer to objects while the incomplete part
yields a referring proper name upon completion by referring
proper names. This, then, is the semantic role of the
incomplete part of a complex proper name. I shall not
examine this argument, which Furth offers as an antidote
to the Fregean metaphors, in ~·eater detail. I am primarily
interested in Furth's argument for (11), for contained in
his argument that incomplete expressions have reference 13
Furth's proposed solution to the specification problem.
Basically, Furth's claim in support of (11) 1s that a
distinction can be made for incomplete expressions that
corresponds to the distinction for proper names between
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having reference and lacking reference. By developing this
analogy, Furth argues that incomplete expressions can properly
be said to have reference. His project 1s to strengthen this
analogy to the point that he can conclude that incomplete
expressions do refer. His conclusion, then, 1s that
incomplete expressions refer, but not in the same manner as
do proper names. There are two types of reference.
The distinction Furth draws for incomplete expressions
turns on a certain property which Furth calls "property Z".
(Z) An incomplete expression has property Z if
and only if every result of completing
that expression with any referring proper
name has reference.
We are to assume that we know what it 1s for a proper name
to refer. Furth's aim, then, 1s to argue that for an
incomplete expression to have property Z is for that expression
to have reference. His argument by analogy has two parts.
First, he argues that a proper name's having reference and
an incomplete expression's having property Z contribute in
exactly the same way to the possession of reference by the
complex proper name in which they occur. The second part of
the analogy consists in showing that having property Z, for
incomplete expressions, plays the same role as having
referen~e, for proper names, in quantification.
Before I examine Furth's evidence in support of this
symmetry, I should point out that he finds the following
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passage from the Grundgesetze quite suggestive:
A name of a first-level function of one argument
has a denotation (denotes something, su~~eeds in
denoting) if the proper name that results from
this function name by its argument-places' bei~g
filled by a proper name always has denotation.
This is, of course, the criterion that Dummett had in mind
when he suggested the predicate 'is something that everythin~
either 1s or is not' as a reolacement fcrrthe unsuitable 'is
~ .
a concept'. Concept words, or predicates, for which the
law of excluded middle does not hold do not succeed in
referring. While Furth recognizes that Frege does not offer
the above passage as a definition of reference for incomplete
expressions, Furth believes that, in practice, Frege does
take the condition of an incomplete expression's having Z
as corresponding to the condition of a proper name's having
reference. With respect to non-referring concept words,
Frege writes:
These are not such as, say, contain a contradiction
-- for there is nothing wrong at all 1n a concept's
being empty -- but such as have vague boundaries.
It must be determinate for every object whether it
falls under a concept or not; a concept word which
3. Gottlob Frege J The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, trans. and
ed. Montgomery Furth (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1964), p. 84.
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does not meet this requirement on its [reference]
1s [referenceless].q
I grant that if an incomplete expression lacks property Z
then Frege would say that it does not refer. An incomplete
expression lacks Z it some completion of it by a referring
proper name lacks reference.
An example of what Frege has in mind here is the concept
word 'bald'. Any predicate. or concept word, that 1s neither
true nor false of a given object lacks Z. The complete
expression that results from completing a predicate 1s a
sentence. The expression '( ) is bald' does not have Z since
there is at least one proper name a such that r a is bald~
has no reference, or truth value.
,
Furth argues that having Z is a necessary and surri.c1ent
condition for an incomplete expression's hav1n~ reference.
His view 1s that an incomplete expression contributes to the
reference of a complex proper name in which it occurs, and
yet while he wants to call this contribution "reference", he
holds that reference for inco~plete expressions lsd1fferent
from reference for proper names.
Before I assess Furth's claim, I shall examine the
analogy he draws between an incomplete expression's having Z
and a proper name's having reference. It 1s on the basis
4. Frege, Posthumous Writings, p. 122.
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of this analogy that Furth proposes that having Z 1s having
reference.
I have said that the first half of the analogy consists
in the claim that the possession or a reference by a proger
name and the possession of property Z by an incomplete
expression contribute to the possession of a reference by
the complex prope~ name of which they are constituents.
This can be put more clearly as follows. According to
Frege, if any part of a complex proper name, complete or
incomplete, lacks ref~rence then the whole fails to refer.
Since Furth is, for the time being, leaving open the question
of whether incomplete expressions have reference, his plan
1s to establish a symmetry, with respect to this principle.
between a proper name's having reference and an incomplete
expression's having property Z.
Consider the complex proper name fa is an F'. If the
incomplete expression '( ) 1s an F' has property Z and 'a
1s an F' does not refer, then it follows that 'a' does not
refer. If 'a' does refer and 'a is an F' does not refer then
it follows that '( .) is an F' does not have property Z.
Hence, Furth concludes, having property Z for '( ) is an
F' and having reference for 'a' play analogous roles with
respect to having reference for the complex proper name 'a
1s an F'. In fact, for a complex proper name to have reference
it 1s sufficient that its complete parts have reference and
its incomplete part have property Z .
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To strengthen the analogy, Furth argues that it 1s
necessary, too. That is, for a complex proper name to have
reference it 1s necessary that its complete parts have
reference and that its incomplete parts have property Z. His
claim 1s that if 'a is an F' has a reference then 'a' refers
and '( ) 1s an F' has Z. He points out that Frege requires
that functions be everywhere defined and that the law of
excluded middle hold for concepts. Thus, in Furth's termino-
logy. Frege requires that incomplete expressions have property
Z. Those that lack Z are to be expelled from the language
along with non-referring proper names.
The second half of the analogy concerns the link between
quantlf1cation,and reference. Since the Fregean terms 'f1rst-
level function name' and 'second-level function name' are
not available to Furth at this juncture, he distinguishes
different types or incomplete expressions. A type-l
incomplete expression is an incomplete expression that 1s
completed by a proper name. Atype-2 incomplete expression
1s an incomplete expression that 1s completed by a type~l
incomplete expression, and a type-3 incomplete expression 1s
completed by a type-2 incomplete expression. A proper name
is not a type-2 incomplete expression because it is not an
incomplete expression. Among type-2 incomplete expressions
are those whose behavior resembles the behavior of flrst-
order quantifiers. He calls these new expressions "virtual"
quantifiers. Furth examines the role of having reference by
proper names and having Z by type-l incomplete expressions
in these type~2 expressions.
The virtual quantification ,[x] Fx' refers to the True
if every completion of 'F ( )' by a referring proper name
refers to the True. Thus the virtual quantifications are
quantifications with respect to those objects that are
nameable in the language. Furth's interest is in the role of
referring proper names in the truth conditions for quantification.
If a universal quantification '(x)Fx' refers to the True
and if some instance 'Fa' does not refer to the True, then
'a' must lack reference. The reference of a virtual quanti-
flcatlon ,[x] Fx' depends on the reference of 'Fa' only for
referring proper names 'a'. Consider, for example, the virtual
quantification ,[x] (x=x)' which is the completion of the
type-2 expression ,[x] <,(x))' by the type-l expression
'(~) = (~)'. On Furth's account of the virtual quantifier,
this refers to the True, for every completion of t(~) = (~)'
by a referring name 'a' refers to the True. Note that
completions 'a=a' by non-referring names 'a' do not refer
to the True, for they do not refer at all.
Furth introduces certain type-3 incomplete expressions
whose behavior resembles the behavior of second-order
quantifiers. Second··order quantifiers are those that bind
predicate variables. Of course Furth cannot here assume that
predicate variables have reference. Again, Furth calls
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these type-3 expressions "virtual" quantifiers. Furth
strengthens the analogy between having property Z and having
reference through an examination of these new expressions.
He constructs an expression in which having Z plays the same
role for type-l incomplete expressions that having reference
played for proper names in first-order virtual quantification.
The expression:
(2) [f] (Ms feB))
is a completion of a type-3 incomplete exoresslon. It refers
to the True if every completion of 'M6~(6)' by a type-l
in complete expression with property Z refers to the True.
It refers to the False if any completion by a type-l expression
with Z does not refer to the True. Why does Furth stiuplate
that the type-l expression must have Z?
If we complete the type-3 expression in (2) with th~
type-2 expression
(3) [x] (~(x):::> ~(x))
the result is
(4) [f] [x] (r(x):::» r(x))
According to Furth's definition, (4) refers to the True if
every completion of (3) by a type-l incomplete expression
with Z refers to the True. To see the role of property Z,
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suppose that 'F( )' does not have property Z. Then the
instance:
(5) [x] (F(x) ~ F(x))
does not refer to the True since not every completion of
'F( ) ~ F( )' by a referring proper name refers to the True.
Hence, if type-l expressions lacking Z were allowed, (4)
would not refer to the True. But obviously (4) 1s true.
This 1s analogous to Furth's d1scl.ission of '[ x] (x=x) , •
Furth explains the reference of '[x](F(x))' in terms of the
completion of 'F( )' by referring complete names. Otherwise
expressions such as '[x](x-x)' which should refer to the
True would not refer at all. Similarly, if the reference
of (2) were not explained in terms of the completion of
tMst(S)t by type-l expressions having Z, then expressions
such as (4) would not refer-to the True.
The analogy is now complete. Property Z plays the same
role in second-order quantification that reference plays in
first-order quantification.
On the basis of these analogies and symmetries Furth
proposes that having property Z 1s having reference for
incomplete expressions. Incomplete expressions, including
predicates, can properly be regarded as referring, yet they
do not refer to objects. Reference for predicates is not a
two-place relation between an expression and an object.
Proper names have "saturated reference" and predicates have
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"un8aturated reference". For any predicate to have unsat~rated
reference 1s for it to have property Z. There are not two
types ot entities. A predicate does not refer in virtue of
bearing a certain relation to a peculiar kind of entity; it
refers in virtue or-having the property Z.
But if we can properly call having Z "having reference".
how do we accordingly ascribe and specify reference for
incomplete expressions? According to Furth, just as there
are two ways or referring, there are two corresponding ways
of ascribing and specifying reference. Thus he offers the
following as forms for ascribing and specifying reference for
an incomplete expression B. respectively:
(III) «(I) (8) (x) (41 refers to x and S refers to x::;)
(81) (the completion of B with a
refers to y and the completion of
B with S refers to y»
(IV) (eI) (x) (fJ refers to x ~ the completion of B
with ~ refers to F(x»
The problem with specification, claims Furth, has been resolved.
We can specify the reference of '1s a horse' as follows:
(CI) (x) ((I refers to x~the completion or '1s a horse'
with a 1s true if x is a horse and false if
x is not a horse).
Furth's treatment or reference is a modification of Frege's
theory. Is it an acceptable one for Frege? It is clear
that Frege's theory requires quantification over functions
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and concepts. If Furth's proposal cannot meet Frege's needs
for second-order quantification, then this modification must
be rejected as too radical.
Furth proposes that a predicate has "reference" in virtue·
of yielding referring proper names upon completion by
referring proper names. He says that his proposal "consists
in regarding the matter not in terms of two types of denoted
"entities", but rather in terms of two types of denoting ...
On this basis, an incomplete name's meeting the Z condition
1s not a sign that it therefore denoteS (in the manner of a
complete name) something mysterious (unsaturated): it is
itself a second manner of denoting.,,5
Reference for predicates, then, is not a binary relation
between an expression and an entity. Thus it does not follow
from Furth's definition of reference for incomplete expressions
that concepts and functions exist. It appears that Furth's
proposal does not license quantification with respect to
predicates and function-names. This criticism might, however,
be based on a superficial reading of Furth.
Furth claims that 1t does make s~·~:.se, on his proposal,
to say of a given predicate that it refers to something,
and in recognition of Frege's need for second-order
quantification he writes:
5. Furth, p. 40.
94
We have a powerful motivation to seek a rationale
for speaking of denoting in connection with [incomplete
expressions]: in the need to introduce quantification
in connection with them. 6
We have seen that Frege requires the means to express
existential and universal claims about concepts and functions,
and this is to be done by replacing ~r~d1cates by quantifiable
variables. Concernin~ this, Furth says:
..• the question whether a term is replaceable with
a blndable variable and the question whether it may
be regard~d as denot1n~ are two s:des of the same
question. {
I gather, then, that ~t is Furth's view that to say that
predicates have reference 1s to say that predicates occur in
positions accessible to variables ~f quantification. Furth
has argued that while predicates do not refer to objects, they
do, nevertheless, refer. Yet it 1s a problem for Furth to
reconcile his treatment of unsaturated reference with the
use of second-order quantification. When we use second-order
quantification, the second-order variables must, for Frege,
range over functions and concepts -- the references of
predicates and function names. If predicates refer in the
manner Furth has proposed, over what do the variables that
6. Ibid., p. 28.
7. Ibid.
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replace predicates range?
Frege maintains that "a concept is the reference of a
predicate".8 Thus to ascribe reference to a predicate is to
assert the existence of a concept. Furth proposes (III) as
the form for ascription of reference to a predicate, and I
think that from it we can determine what, on Furth's view, a
concept is. I believe that Furth holds 9 that when we claim
that a concept exists, or that a predicate has reference, we
are claiming that co.rrespond1ng to a g1ven predicate there is
a certain assignment of truth values to all nameable objects.
That is, if the predicate yields a true sentence upon
completion by a proper name, then the object to which that
proper name refers is assigned the value True. If the
predicate yields a false sentence upon completion by a proper
name then the object to which that proper name refers is
assigned the value False. If the predicate yields a sentence
that 1s neither true nor false upon completion by a proper
name, then that predicate does not "refer"; the assignment 1s
not complete. Hence, given (III), to ascribe reference to
a predicate is to assert that there 1s such a complete
assignment of truth values corresponding to that predicate.
To specify the reference of a predicate 1s to sp~cify what
8. Geach and Black, p. 48.
9. This view 1s suggested in Furth's doctoral dissertation.
Montgomery Furth, "On Concept and Object: Frege and a Problem
of Universals" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley, 1964), p. 200.
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the assignment is. Specification consists in saying for
which objects it 1s the case that the completion of the predicate
with their names results in a true sentence.
This seems to be what Furth means by 'concept'. However,
this explanation looks very much like an explanation of Frege's
notion of the value-range or extension of a concept. Frege
says "we designate as an extension the value-range o~ a
10function whose value for every argument 1s a truth value".
An extension can be understood as a set of ordered pairs, the
first member of which 1s an argument or object, and the second
member of which is a truth value. Understood in this way,
the extension of the concept philosopher, for example, is
the set containing the pairs <Socrates, Trll~>, <Frege, True :> ,
and <Reagan, False ) • among others.
Using Furth's form for specification, thus is what we
specify when we specify the reference of the predicate '(
is a philosopher'. However, Frege does not identify the
extension of a concept with a concept. He says that the
"concept takes logical precedence of its extension".ll More-
over, extensions are objects and concepts are not. If my
explanation of Furth's view of concepts is correct, then it
looks as if he has identified extension with concept. This
is, of course, one avenue open to those who seek a solution
10. Geach and Black, p. 31.
11. Ibid., p. 105.
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to Frege's problem. For, one way for Frege to avoid the
problem with the concept horse is just to give up the idea of
unsaturated reference, and let predicates refer to extensions.
However, this is not the avenue Furth has taken. He has
attempted to retain Frege's thesis that predicates do not
refer to objects and he argu~s ·that predicates do, nonethe-
less, refer. Hence Furth does not intentionally identify
extension with concept.
There are two possible readings of Furth. On one
reading predicates "have reference" but can't be said to
In this case Furth's proposal doe~ not
allow for the quantification over functions and concepts. If
this 1s the correct reading then his modification of Frege's
doctrine must be rejected, for second-order quantification
1s crucial to the project of the Grundgesetze. However,
Furth's proposal Just 1s not Fregean in flavor. Frege really
does intend for predicates to refer to entities, and Furth's
proposal does not capture this at all. Furth ~al1s to
give an adequate characterization of concepts, for it appears
that if he holds that predicates refer in the manner captured
by (III) and (IV) and that a predicate does refer to something,
then the references of predicates turn out to be Fregean
objects. Thus on either reading Furth has not succeeded in
constructing an acceptable modification of Frege's theory.
Furth has succeeded in developing an interesting analogy
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between having reference and having property Z. But in the
end, having Z is not having reference. I believe that Frege
intends only one type of reference. Unless Furth can develop
a "new" kind of quantification to correspond to the "new"
kind of -reference, then it seems that if incomplete expressions
refer they must do so in the same way as proper names.
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CHAPTER III: AN ANTICIPATION OF THE PROBLEM?
In his introduction to the translation of Frege's
"Begrlffsschrift published in From Frege to Godel: A Source
Book in Mathematical Logic, Jean van Heljenoort writes:
... If we also observe that in the derivation of
formula (91) he substitutes ~ for f, we sei
that [Frege] 1s on the brink of a paradox.
What this means may, at the moment, be obscure, but it is my
aim to illuminate this passage and as I continue its meaning
\'1111 become clear. 'flaIl HelJer1oort's claim that Frege is "on
the bring of a paradox" ls, of course, metaphorical, for
Frege's system either leads to a paradox or it does net.
Terrell Bynum, in his edition to the Begriffsschrift, maintains
that no paradox can be generated in Frege's system. He
writes:
Van Heijenoort is in error in supposing that any
paradox can aris2 from the deductive procedureFrege uses here.
"1. Jean van He1jenoort, ed., From Frege to Godel: A Source
Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967), p. 3.
2. Gottlob Frege, Conceptual Notation and Related Articles,
trans. and ed., Terrell Ward Bynum, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1972), p. 182 .
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In this chapter I attempt to resolve this dispute. In the
first section of the chapter I reconstruct the system of
Frege's Begrlffsschrlft and show that it is equivalent to a
standard secoad-order predicate calculus, and then demonstrate
tBe consistency of the system. I conclude, then, that if
van Heijenoort # 1s claiming that the system leads to a paradox
or inconsistency, the dispute is settled on the side of Bynum.
In the second part of the chapter I consider the interpretation
of the system of the Begrlrrsschr1ft. Frege is not clear
about how the system 1s to be interpreted. In light of Frege's
later writings on the distinction between-function and object,
the interpretation of second-order quantifications presents
some difficulties for Frege. These difficulties may be seen
as an anticipation of the problem with the concept horse.
The nature of the anticipation will be detailed later. More-
over, certain claims implicit in Frege's way of interpreting
his system lead to Russell's paradox. Hence, I shall argue that
while the system 1s demonstrably consistent, the problems
that arise 1n its interpretation may provide a basis for
van Heljenoort's concern.
Frege's Begriffsschrlft presents an axiomatized system
of logic. One fragment of the system is the propositional
calculus and a larger fragment 1s the first-order predicate
calculus. In Part I of the book Frege gives an explanation
of the language of his system. He distinguishes two kinds of
symbols. First, "those by which we may understand different
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objects", and second, "those that have a completely determinate
meaning". He calls the former "letters" and says that "no
matter how indeterminate the meaning of a letter, we must
insist that throughout a given context, the letter retain the
meaning once given to it".3 Frege's ~letters" are what we
~all "variables". Frege puts different types of letters to
different uses and the typography of the Begriffsschr1ft is
a bit confusing. Roughly, the capital Greek letters
A, B, r, t , 'f, and X
are used to stand for expressions. They might be called
"syntact Ie" or "schemat1c" val11ables • Frege wr1 te 5 J "T use
Greek letters as an abbreviation, and to each of these letters
the reader should attach an appropriate meaning when I do
not expressly give them a definition". 4 The italic Latin
letters
are used as propositional letters, as free variables and also
to indicate generality when the scope of the universal
quantifier 1s not limited. The Roman letter 'F' is used as a
property or function varlable. The lower case Greek letters
3. van Heijenoort, p. 11.
4. Ibid.
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are used to indicate argument places of functions. The
German letters
lllo, ", • •• ,~
are used as bound variables of quantification.
Frege introduces the jUdgment sign and content stroke
by saying that the Judgment sign
"stands to theleft of the sign, or combination of signs,
indicating the content of the judgment. If we omit the small
vertical stroke at the left end of the horizontal one. the
judgment will be transformed into a mere combination of ideas
of which the writer does not state whether he acknowledges
it to be true or not".5 According to Frege,
-A
1s to be read "The proposition that A", and
t-A
1s to be read "the judgment that An. There are problems
with this distinction between the content of a judgment and
a judgment, but it is not my intention to discuss the
5. Ibid.
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distinction here.
Frege's two primitive connectives are the conditional
and negation. These are defined truth functionally. Frege's
conditional 1s the material conditional. Conjunction and dis-
junction are defined in terms of the conditional and negation.
Frege writes 'If B then At as
and 'not A' as
-r A
His truth functional analysis of the conditional leads Frege
to the rule, modus ponens. This rule of inference allows the
derivation of a new judgment from two other judgments. From
the judgments
the judgment
f-A
and t- B
follows. The inference can be written as follows:
t-e:
, B
t A
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Frege's other primitive symbol is the identity sign.
A - B
is to mean that "the sign A and the sign B have the same
conceptual content, so that we can everywhere put B for A
and converSely".6
Frege will later draw an important and celebrated
distinction between function and object. but 1n the
Begriffsschr1ft the distinction 1s between function and
argument. He writes:
If in an expression, whose content need not be
capable of becom~1g a judgment, a simple or
compound sign has one or more occurrences
and if we regard that sign as replaceable in
all or some of these occurrences by something
else (but everywhere by the.·same thing) J then
we call the part that remains invariant in the
expression a function, and th; replaceable part
the argument of the function.
Frege's way of drawing the distinction is syntactic. It
should be noted that his terminology here is not standard.
At this point he takes sentence parts to be functions, yet
later he takes sentence parts to stand for tunctions. In the
Begr1ffsschr1ft Frege regards sentences as functions of the
expressions occurring in them. He goes on to distinguish one-
place from two-place functions and introduces appropriate
notation. Predicates are treated as one-place functions and
6• Ibid., p. 21.
7. Ibid., p. 22.
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relational expressions as two-place functions.
In order to express an indeterminate function of
the argument A, we write A, enclosed in parentheses,
to the right of a letter, for example
~(A)
likewise,
'f(A,B)
means a function of the two arguments A and B that is
not determined any further •.• In gene~al
'{I(A,B)
differs from
8
'i'(B,A).
Frege's distinction between function and argument leads him to
treat "functions" as arguments. As we shall see shortly, this
seems to p~ovlde the basis for Frege's use of second-order
q1 antlf1catlon, and may be responsible for van He1jenoort' s
worry.
Following his discussion of the function, Frege introduces
his notion of generality as follows:
In the expression of a Judgment we can always regard
the combination of signs to the right of ~ as a
function of the signs occurring in it. If we replace
this argument by a German letter and if in the content
stroke we introduce a concavity with this German letter
in it, as in
her- t(~)
this stands for the judgment that whatever we may take
for its argument, the function is a fact. 9
8. Ibid., p. 23
9. Ibid., p. 24.
106
Frege goes on to introduce what 1s, in effect, the second-
order quantifier. He wr1 tE5:
Since a letter used as a sign for a function,
such as ~ in ~(A) can itself be regarded as
the argument of a function, its place can be
taken iy the manner Just specified by a German
letter. 0
Thus ~(A) yields both
and
Frege defines the existential quantifier in terms of the
universal quantifier and negation in the usual manner.
The concavity in the content stroke indicates the scope
of the German letter in it. For instance, the scope of
'A.' in
~- A(",,)
B(fit, , J )
is the entire content of the judgment while in
the scope 1s confined to the antecedent of the conditional.
10. Ibid.
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Italic Latin letters are used when the scope of the generality
1s the entire content. Given this, Frege introduces a
principle of universal generalization which r shall discuss
a bit later.
In Part II of the Begrlffschr1ft Frege begins to formulate
his axiomatic system and derive some of its theorems. He
draws a distinction between his rules or "modes" of inference
and his axioms, or "rules of pure thought". He presents a
total of nine axioms and derives more complex jUdgments in
accordance w~th his rules of inference. At the start of
Part II Frege writes:
Merely to know the laws 1s obviously not the
same as to know them together with the connection
tnat some have to others. In this way we arrive
at a small number of laws in which, if we add
those contained in the rules, the content of all
the la!~ is included, albeit in an undeveloped
state.
The judgments of Parts II and III are numbered. The nine
laws, or axioms, are the following:
(1)
(2)
.-.......- .....--- a.
~-b
...-.----4.
......~-...--~-- '"
.---c
----......-b
.......-c
~b
......----c,
11. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
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( 8) I aI 1 1 d
b
al b
rA.
(28) b
a
a.
b
(31) a.
n- tl
------ --- --------------~--------~--~
(41)
(52)
(54)
(58)
"'-"""'-...-_- f(d.)
'------ ftc)
~---(c=d)
------(c: c)
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Axioms (1), (2), (8), (31), and (41) together with modus
ponens and Frege's unstated substitution rule constitute a
complete axiomatization of the propositional calculus. 12
The nine axioms together with modus ponens, universal generali-
zation, and confinement constitute a complete first-order
predicate calculus. 13 I shall show that Frege's nine axioms
together with modus ponens, universal generalization, confine-
ment, and his rules for substitution constitute a con~istent
second-order predicate calculus. Frege's substitution rules
are not explicitly stated. I shall provide a formulation of
these rules later.
The system to which I shall show Frege's to be equivalent
is Joel Robbin's as presented in his Mathematical 105ic.14
His system 1s given by six axioms and two rules of inference.
The symbols of Robbin's system are the individual variables
...
the n-place relation variab1es 15
12. proved by ~ukas1ewcz, 1931.
13. shown by Kneale.
14. Joel W. Robbin, Mathematical 10~iC, (New York and Amsterdam:
W.A. Benjamin, Inc., 1969), Chapter .
15. Robbin uses lower case Greek letters as relation
variables.
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F , G , H , FI , GI , HI' F2 , G2 , H2 , J
and the symbols
~ f \:j [ ] ( ) ,
The class of well-formed formulas is defined inductively as
follows:
(1) If $ is an n-place relation variable or an n-place
constant and al,a2, •.• ,an 1s a sequence of symbols
each of which 1s either an individual variable or
individual constant, then ~(alJa2,.•• ,an) is a wff.
(il) f 1s a wff
(ii1) If A and B are wffs, so is A~ B
(iv) If A 1s a wff and v 1s any variable, then ~vA is
a wff
(v) A formula 1s a wff only as required by (i)-(1v).
Robbins six axioms are the following:
(AI)
(A2)
(A3)
(A4)
(A5)
(A6)
A~ (B J A)
(A~(B::>C))':) «A~B)~ (A~C))
--A ~ A
"IvA ::::> s~ r where v is any variable and ! is a variable
or constant of the same type (that is, an individual
variable or constant if v is an individual variable
and an n-place relation variable or constant if v
1s an n~place variable) and a 1s free for v in A
'r/v(A:) B) ~ (A::;) vvB) where v has no free occurrence
in A
8Fv x 1 vX 2 ••• VX (F(xl,x2' ••• xn )": A)where F 1s an9 n-place relation variable not
occurring free in A and xl,x2, ..• ,xn are individual
variables.
III
(A6) 1s the comprehension axiom schema and says that every
well-formed formula defines a relation of objects. The two
rules of inference are modus ponens and universal generaliza-
t1on:
(Rl) B can be inferred from A and A '::) B
(R2) ~vA can be inferred from A if v is any variable.
Robbin's first three axioms are Frege's formulas (1), (2),
and (31), respectively. To show that Frege's system is
equivalent to RObbin's involves showing that Frege's substitution
rules are equivalent to Robbin's comprehension axiom schema.
But first I shall discuss Robbin's rule of un1vers~1 generaliza-
t10n and his (A4) and (A5) which are his principles of
universal instantiation and confinement.
RObbin's principle of universal instantiation is given
by the schema:
(A4) "IvA::;) s:I J where v is any variable of the
same type as !.
This for~ulatlon allows instantiation of both first-order
and second-order quantifications. Frege's principle of
universal instantiation is not stated in the same way. His
formula (58) is a first-order principle of instantiation:
( 58) 'l:\;:=fee)
'" f(~)
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whlah together with substitution gives rise to an infinite
number or instances. Although Frege does not enunciate a
second-order principle of universal instantiation, it 1s clear
from the text that he intends his system to include one.
Frege treats first-order and second-order quantification
in a parallel fashion. At the time of the writing or the
Begrif_schr1tt Frege had not yet distinguished the different
levels ot functions. Later he would say that the first-order
quantifier stands tor a second-level function and the second-
order quantifier stands ror a third-level function. In the
Begr1rrsschrft, however, after introducing his notation tor
the first-order quantifier, he draws on his notions of
function and argument to introduce second-order quantification.
Since 'F(A)' can be seen as a function of the argument 'F',
'F' can be replaced by a German letter.
At this point in the text Frege first introduces a
principle or universal instantiation. He says:
From such a Judgment, therefore, we can always
derive an arbitrary number or Judgments of less
general content by substituting each time some-
thing else for the German letter and then removing
the concavity in the content stroke. 16
It1sclear that Frege intends this principle to apply to both
first-order and second-order quantifications. When he says
that we can sUbstitute "something else for the German letter",
this German letter may be either upper case or lower casej
16. van He1Jenoort, p. 2~.
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that 1s, it may be e1ther an individual bound variable or
a functional bound variable. Thus from
we can derive each of
~(&)
~ CO)
and ~ce)
and from
we are supposed to be able to derive
I- f (4)
r ~(4)
and r A(4)
The same considerations apply to Frege's rules of universal
generalization and confinement.
Frege gives his rule of universal generalization as
follows:
A Latin letter may always be replaced by a German
one that does not yet occur in the jUdgment; then
the concavity must be introduced immediately after
the jUdgment stroke. For example, instead of
....-.... X(ct)
we can write
t-\!r- X(~) • 17
17. Ibid., p. 25.
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Given Frege's remarks concerning the replacement of a function
letter by a German letter, it 1s clear that he intends his rule
of universal generalization to hold for second-order as well
as first-order variables. Thus from
we can derive
~1'(Q,)
The same can be said of Frege's principle of co~finement,
which Frege states as follows:
It is clear that from
1= ~ (4.)A
we can deriver-r= :(~)
if A is an expression in which ~ does not occur. 18
The justification Frege provides for this principle can
easily be adapted for the second-order case. Furthermore, it
is clear from the text that Frege intends a second-order
principle of confinement, for he ·uses a second-order principle
in several derivat1ons. 19
18. Ibid., p. 26.
19. See the derivations of formulas (91), (93), and (95).
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Thus while Frege does intend his principles of universal
instantiation, universal generalization, and confinement to
be general and not restricted to first-order quantification,
some modification of his formulations is required. This 1s
not a serious difficulty. Frege does act as if these principles
are general ones t and at this stage he saw no need to distinguish
different orders of quantification. This may, in part, be
what concerns van Heljenoort. Yet an appropriate modification
1s consistent with Frege's remarks about the quantifier and
generality.
One possible modification is suggested by Bynum in his
introduction to the Begrlffsschrlft. Bynum points out that
Frege occasionally cites a first-order principle in a derivation
when, strictly, he needs a corresponding second-order principle.
In fact, it 1s these slips that worry van Heijenoort. In
particular, van He1jenoort 1s concerned about the derivation
of formulas (77) and (91). He writes:
In the derivation of (77) [Frege] substitutes
~for a in rea), at least as an intermediate
step. -If we also observe that in the derivation
of formula (91) he substitutes 7 for f O we seethat he is on the brink of a paradox. 2
Bynum agrees that there 1s a problem with Frege's derivations
of (77) and (91) but he offers a solution. He does not view
the difficulty as symptomatic of any inconsistency in Frege's
20. van He1jenoort J p. 3.
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system. His solution 1s to provide, in each case, an
appropriate corresponding second-order principle.
In the derivation of (77), for instance, Frege cites
(68) and indicates the substitutions by a table. The table
does indicate that ~15 to be substituted for a in (68),
yet Bynum points out that Frege really should have cited an
analogous second-order principle that involves quantification
over functions. Bynum provides the appropriate second-order
principle that Frege should have cited instead of the
first-order principle that he does cite. Bynum treats the
derivation of (91) in the same way. In a footnote to formula
(77) he says:
The idea of treating F(y) as a function of the
function F 1s in no way con~rary to Frege's later
thought. To state his thought precisely, however,
required notational machinery (which he had not
yet devised) to distinguish flrst- from second-
level functions. With that available the dlrflculty
can easily be resolved. Van Heljenoort 1s in error
1n supposing that any paradox can arise in the
system. In the Begr1ffsschr1ft Frege never
confuses f1rst- and second-level functions, though
he does not yet have separate terms for them. 21
I agree with Bynum here, yet his treatment has certain
drawbacks. Frege's formula (68) is:
( 68 ) f(t.)
"'-"-"-0
.......-.--((~fn~» =b]
21. Bynum, p. 175.
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The formula Bynum supplies to be used in its stead in the
derivation of (77) 1s:
(68'):.........-....-- M, fC,)
...--b
~-~ [( ~---- M,'3'(~) =b]
Together with the substitution table he provides, (68') does
yield (77) . While Frege's (68) is a first-order formula,
Bynum's (68') 1s a second-order formula. Yet the notation
of (68') 1s not the notation of the Begriffsschr1ft. In
formula (68), 'f' 1s a first-level function letter, and 'e'
stands 1n its argument-place in 'f(c)'. In formula (68'),
'M' 1s a second-level function letter and 'f' 1s a first-level
function letter that stands in its argument place in 'MefeS)'.
Thus 'f(~)' 1s a first-level function name where '~' indicates
the argument place and 'Me,e )' is a second-level function
name where ',( )' indicates the argument place. The f1rst-
order quantifier of (68) is a second-level function name
whose argument place is filled by a first-level function name.
The second-order quantifier of (68') 1s a third-level function
name whose argument place is filled by a second-level function
name.
Bynum's solution invokes a dlst~nctlon Frege later makes
between different levels of functions and accordingly involves
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expanding the syntax of the Begr1ffsschr1ft to include higher
level function names. Bynum's treatment of (68) suggests
introducing second-order formulas which, together with Frege's
substitution rules, will provide second-order principles of
universal instantiation, universal generalization, and
confinement. In particular, a second-order principle of
universal instantiation would be:
(58')
With substitution (58') gives rise to all the desired instances
of universal instantiation. Universal generalization and
confinement may be treated in a parallel manner.
Yet there 1s a problem with this solution, for, as we
have seen, it entails expanding the notation of the Begrlffsschr1ft
to include second-level function letters as well as f1rst-
level function letters. If the notation 1s so expanded,
the original problem 1s merely removed to a higher level.
If we allow second-level function letters and the replacement
of these letters by German letters, then third-order quantifica-
tion 1s introduced. Hence third-order principles of universal
instantiation, universal generalization, and confinement
must be formulated. Yet if these third-order principles are
introduced in a parallel way, they will involve third-level
function letters, and the original problem recurs on a diffe~ent
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level.
A modification that avoids the defect of Bynum's treatment
is to offer schematic formulations of second-order principles
of universal Inatant1at1on, universal generalization, and
confine~~nt. In the case of universal instantiation, a
schema 1s ~eeded that will allow the derivation of
• •• F •••
from
For universal generalization a schematic rule is needed that
allows the derivation of
from
• •• F ••• J
and for confinement the needed schema will allow the
derivation of
···'] ...
• • • 4> • • •
from
· · · '1. · ·
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where
...,...
does not contain free occurrences of~. The principles may
be stated after those of RObbin as follows:
(UI) VvA~ S:AI where v and a are function variables
(UG) VvA can be inferred from A, if v 1s a function
variable
(Canf) l-Jv(A => B) ~ (A ~ VvB) where v is a function
variable not free in A.
In this way, Frege's principles are equivalent to Robbin's.
The remaining discrepancy between Robbin's and Frege's
systems can be eliminated by showing that Frege's rules for
substitution are equivalent to the comprehension axiom schema.
As I have said, Frege does not clearly enunciate his rules
for substitution, but by observing his practice the rules
can be formulated.
Frege does state a principle for the alphabetic change
of variables:
Replacing a German letter everywhere in its scope
by some other one ls, of course, permitted, so
long as in places where different letters initially
stood different ones also ~tand afterward. This
has no effect on content. 2
Of course Frege must mean that a bound variable may be replaced
by another v~r1able of the same type. In this way we avoid
22. van Heijenoort, p. 51.
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the sbustltutlon of a function letter for an individual
variable and Y1.£.! versa. Frege's remark that this "has no
effect on the content" hints at an important restriction that
must be placed on sbust1tut1on. Roughly, we want to ensure
that variables that are rree or bound in the original formula
remain free or bound 1n the formula that results from
substitution. Frege's substitution rules are to preserve
validity, implication, and equivalence. There are two kinds
of substitution that must be regulated -- substitution for
propositional letters and substitution for predicate and
function letters.
Frege does permit substitution of formulas for propositional
letters. He derives a formula or demonstrates its validity
and uses substitution instances of the formula to derive
other formulas. He treats propositional letters as variables
and substitutes more complicated propositional and quantlflcational
formulas for them. He says that expressions that give way
to their various substitution instances "contain" those
instances as "special cases".23
In most derivations Frege cites the number of a jUdgment
to be used in the derivation and indicates the substitutions
to be made by a table under the citation. It 1s left to the
reader ~ construct the appropriate substitution instance of
the cited formula. The table serves as an abbreviation. For
example,
23. Ibid., p. 16.
·- .._._-~_.~~--
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( 1) :
b
.--.-...........--.....1 - It
.......-c
....--...--6
---.--J---- a.
~-b
......----C
-------4
---b
1s an abbreviation for:
in judgment (1) put
.....-..---..--tt
c
-----h
--~-...--a
•
....----C
for 'tl', and
-~-----a
------0
for 'b'.
The rule that governs the derivation of quant1f1cational
formulas from truth functional formulas, and more complex
formulas from simpler formulas can be stated as follows: 24
(81) A formula A may be substituted for a proposi-
tional letter in a formula B provided that no
free variable af A is captured by a quantifier
of B.
24. See V.W. Quine, Methods of Logic, (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970) 3rd ed. for a discussion of
what I label '(S1)' and '(S2)'.
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Frege also allows substitution for functional letters or
predicate letters. For example, consider the table:
(53):
F(A) (A = C).
Judgment (53) is the following:
(53) ~ :~4~
1 - FCt)
Hence the substitution instance constructed from the table
is:
----....--.--.--- d. =c
-------- c =et
c =e
-
Frege's use of the capital Greek letters 'A', 'Bt, and 'r'
in such tables 1s similar to Quine's use of circled numerals
'~" '~" 'CE)', ... as place holders in schematic
predicates. A schematic predicate, for Quine, is like an
open sentence except that it contains place-holders instead
of some or all of the free variables. For example,
'F 0', 'G 00' , and '(ax)(FQ) x & Gx CD)'
are schematic predicates. Monadic schematic predicates may
be substituted for monadic predicates and, in general, n-place
schematic predicates may be substituted for n-place predicates.
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In the table25
rCA) (A = C)
'A' acts like Quine's '~'. The table indicates that
'(2) = c), is to be substituted for the monadic 'f'.
Appropriate restrictions must be placed on the substitution
or schematic predicates for predicates or function letters.
It must be ensured that no variable of the sbust1tuted
schematic predicate becomes captured by· a quantifier of the
formula in which it is SUbstituted, and no variable of the
formula 1s captured by a quantifier of the predicate. The
rule may be stated as follows:
(82) A schematic predicate may be substitute
for a function letter or predicate in a
formula A provided that no free variable
of the predicate 1s captured by a quantifier
of A and no free variable of A 1s captured
by a quantifier of the predicate.
It remains to show that the rules of substitution and
the comprehension axiom schema of Robbin's system are equivalent.
In the proofs that follow I take for granted the rules of
existential generalization, existential instantiation, and
other basic logical rules that are common to first-order and
second-order quantification. The justifications of these
rules do not involve either substitution or the comprehension
25. van Heijenoort, p. 24.
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axiom.
First, to ~hcw that substitution implies the comprehension
axiom schema, note that
( 1 ) ('a' x ) ( G( x) ..... G( x ) )
is a theorem. By existential generalization we can derive
( 2 ) (3 F ) (V x ) ( F ( x) ++ G( x) ) •
By substituting t~t for '0' in (2) we get
( 3) (~ F ) (v x ) ( F ( x) ++ ~ ( x) )
which 1s the comprehension axiom.
The other direction 1s the derivation of substitution
from the comprehension axiom. Given some theorem
(1) ••• G( ) •••
where 'G' 1s a functional variable, we want to show
(2) ••• t( )
to be a theorem as well, where 't' 1s a formula substituted
for '0' in (1). Frege's substitution table would look like:
(1) :
G(r) I t(r).
In broad outline, the proof goes as follows. First we show
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that
( 3) (V x) (F ( x) ....... ~ ( x) ) => (. . .F ( )... ...... ••• ~ ( )...)
holds for all formula contexts
...
The proof is by mathematical induction on the complexity of
the formula context in which 'F' occurs. An application of
universal generalization to (3) yields
(4) ('iF) [(Vx)(F(x) ++ ~(x»~( ••• F( ) ~( ) ••• )]
Since 'F' does not occur free in '~', (4 ) is equivalent to
(5) (8F)(Vx)(F(x) ++ t(x)):::> ( ••• Fe )....... ~( )... )
which is equivalent to
( 6) (~F) (V' x ) (F ( x) .-.. ~ ( x) & ••• F ( ) ••• => ... ~ ( )...
Formula (1) 1s a theorem, hence we may apply universal
generalization to get
(7) (VF) ( ••• F( ) ••• )
and by universal instantiation we get
( 8) ... F ( ) •••
By logic, the comprehension axiom,
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(9) (~F)(~x) (F(x) ++ ~(x)) J
together with (8) yields
( 10) ( ~F) (V~ ( F ( x ) ..-. ~ ( x )) 3r ••• F ( ) •••
Modus ponens applied to (6) and (10) yields
( 2 ) •• • ~ ( ) •••
which 1s what we set out to derive. Hence substitution
follows from the comprehension axiom.
I have shown that Frege's substitution rules are equivalent
to Robbin's comprehension axiom schema. The reconstruction
of the Begrlffsschrift is now complete. Frege's system is
equivalent to Robbin's second-order predicate calculus.
Thus in order to show that Frege's system 1s consistent, all
that remains to show 1s that Robbin's second-order logic 1s
consistent.
The function ~ is defined indtlctlvely as follows:
(1)
(1:1)
(111)
(iv)
(v)
If A is an atomic formula, 'e(A)~ 1s the result
of erasing all the individual variables and constants
of A.
If A is an quantification' '1vB', r e(A)' 1s re(B)'
If A is a negation r_B" '-e(A)'.is r_e(B)~
r ..,..,
If A 1s a conditional B~ C J e(A) is
re(B) ;:) e(C)"
If A is a quantification r(VV)B", 'e(A)' is the
conjunction of the result of substituting tT' for
'V' in re(B)' and the result of sUbstituting '~'
for 'v' in re(B)'.
(vi)
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... , r ..If A is a quantification (3V)B, e(A) 1s the
disjunction of the result of substituting 'T' for
'V' in re(B~' and the result of sUbstituting '..L'
for 'V' in e(B)".
We want to show that ·for each axiom A, feCAl' is a
,
tautology and furthermore that the rules of inference preserve
tautologousness. It will follow, then, that if A 1s a theorem,
,. .,
e(A) is a tautology.
For the first three axioms, (Al)-(A3), of Robbin's system,
it 1s clear that an application of ~ yields a tautology.
(A4) is universal instantiation:
fe:(\{v)(A(v) ~ A(a»]" is a tautology of the form:
(A5) 1s confinement:
~ ~
e[('fv) (A ~ B) ~ (A ~ (VV)B)] 1s a tautology of
the form: (p~q)~ (P:Jq)
(A6) is the comprehension axiom schema:
~[(3F)(Vx)(F(x) ~ t(x»]' is fT~e(t)vJ...... e(~)'
is a tautology
(Rl) is modus ponens:
If re(A)' and '-e(A":) B)' are tautologies, then
so is "'e(B)"
'(R2) is universal generalization:
If t"e(A)~ is a tautology, then so is t"e[('fv)A]' ,
,. ,
which 1s just e(A).
Hence for all formulas A, if A is a theorem, t"e(A)' 1s a
tautology. If Band ,. -B~ were both theorems, then re(B)" and
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.. .,
-e(B) would both be tautologies. But this 1s impossible.
Therefore the theory 1s consistent. The application of the
function e 1s tautamount to interpreting the system in a
universe of discourse with a single element. All of the
theorems of the system are true under such an interpretation,
but no formula and its negation can be true.
Frege's Begr1ffsschr1ft 1s consistent. It does not lead
to a paradox. What, then, 1s behind van Heijenoort's worry?
In an attempt to answer this question, I turn now to the
interpretation of Frege's theory.
Frege says very 11tt Ie concerrl1ng the interpretation 0 f
the system presented in the Begr1ffsschr1ft. In particular,
he says little about how we are to interpret the second-order
formulas of the third part of the work. It is these formulas
that concern van He1jenoort. While the inclusion of second-
order quantifications does not render the theory inconsistent,
there are problems associated with the interpretation of
these formulas that can be seen as anticipating problems that
arise in Frege's later writings. In particular, Frege seems
dangerously close to Russell's paradox and the problem with
the concept horse. Before I discuss the interpretation of
Frege's theory I shall take a brief look at the various sorts
of semantics for the second-order predicate calculus.
There are three sorts of structures for second-order
logic. I call these "pre-models", "general mOd\:ls", and
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"standard models". A "pre-model" is an infinite. sequence
where D 1s a non-empty set of objects over which the
individual variables range, and eachd9
n
is an arbitrary non-
empty set of n-place relations on D. Thus each element of
~n 1s a subset of Dn . All the axioms of the system we have
considered hold in these structures except for the comprehension
axiom schema. ~ot every instance of the comprehension schema
holds in all pre-models, for each /) need not contain all
n
the n-place relations on D. For example, consider the following
instance of the comprehension schema:
(~ F ) ('I x) (F ( x) .-.. G( x) & H ( x) ) •
This will not hold in a structure of this sort if the set
does not contain the intersection of each pair of its elements.
"General models" are just like pre-models except that they
are constructed so that each instance of the comprehension
axiom schema holds in the model. Thus it is stipulated that
these models contain every relation that can be defined in
the structure by a formula of second-order logic. There 1s
a completeness proof for second-order logic relative to
models of this second kind. The proof is essentially the
same as the completeness proof for first-ordeF logic,
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for this version of second-order lo~1c 1s, in a sense,
reducible to first-order logic. 26 Thus it can be shown that
every formula true 1n all general models is provable.
The third sort of model is a "standard model". These
are the intended models for full second-order logic. The
other sorts of models are non-standard and give something
less than full second-order logic. The standard models
specify a non-empty set of objects over which the~lndlv1dual
variables range. The d~main for the second-order variables
is the set of all n-place relations on the domain of individuals.
It is well known that full second-order logic is incomplete
in the sense that the set of valid formulas is not axiomatl-
zable. Hence there are valid formulas of full second-order
logic that are not provable in the system we have shown to
be consistent.
Frege was not concerned with truth in models, nor did
he ask whether his system is complete. It Is not clear how
. Frege chose his axioms, but it is clear that he did not
have in mind any of the three sorts of models I have described.
I shall describe the semantics I believe Frege did have in
mind for the system of his Begrlffsschrlft.
The universe of discourse for Frege's individual variables
is not restricted; it 1s the entire universe. Although Frege
never explicitly states this, it is implicit 1n the text of
26. See Herbert B. Enderton, A Mathematical Introduction to
Logic, (New York and London: Academic Press, 1972), Chapter 4.
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the Begriffsschrlft. Frege translates the quantification:
as "the jUdgment that whatever \A/e may take for its argument,
the function 1s a fact n27 , and
as "whatever'" may be, X(~) must always be denied".28 In
anot her place Frege wr1 tes, "----6-- f(A.) means that f( A.)
takes place whatever we may understand by A.".29 It 1s clear
that Frege does not restrict the ran~e of the individual
variables; they range of "\oJhatever we may take as value",
that Is, everything that there 1s. As a result, any
formula
t(x)
expresses a generality about everything in the universe. The
notation of the universal quantifier is introduced both as a
way to confine the scope of the generality to the antecedent
of a formula and, in conjunction with negation, to express
particular existential claims. We can assume Frege to have a
certain interpretation in mind. I see no reason to think that
27. van He1jenoort, p. 24.
28. Ibid., p. 27.
29. Ibid., p. 51.
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functional and predicate letters do not range over Fregean
functious and concepts. Since the range of the individual
variables 1s the entire universe, the range of the functional
variables 1s included in the range of the individual variables.
Frege does not distinguish different universes of discourse
for different types of variables. As we have seen, Frege
makes no formal distinction between first-order and second-
order quantification. Second-order quantification 1s
introduced for the same considerations as 1s first-order
quantification. Both follow naturally from his discussion of
the function and argument.
It should be noted that although Frege's notions of
function and argument are presented syntactically in the
Begr1ffsschrlft, in view of his later characterization of
functions and concepts, function variables cannot range over
sets of objects or individuals. Sets are "complete", or
"saturated", and hence lack the requisite incompleteness of
the function.
How, then, are we to interpret the second-order formulas
of the Begr1rrsschr1ft? While Frege says little about
quant1ficatlonal formulas under interpretation, the text does
provide a few clues. In his section on functions, Frege writes
that the formula
r teA)
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can be read as 'A has the property ~,30t and the formula
-- 'if (A,B)
as 'B stands in the relation 'I' to A'. 31 Thus one-place
functional letters stand for properties and two-place
functional letters for two-place relations. Fre~e translates
~I\(")
as 'there are1\', where we call something that has the property
1\ a A. Hence when functional letters occur in quantifiers
we can presume that they range over properties and relations.
For Frege, an object has a property t just in case that object
falls under the concept~. In "On Concept and Object" Frege
writes:
I call the concepts under which an object falls
its properties; thus 'to be t is a property of
r' 1s just another way of saying 'r falls under
the concept of a t'.32
Frege does talk of the relation ~ and the property ~, yet
we may assume that properties are Fregean concepts and that
a suitable interpretation of the system must take care to
30. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
31. Ibid., p. 24.
32. Geach and Black, p. 51.
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avoid running into the problem with the concept horse. In light
of Frege's doctrines concerning concepts and objects, it is
clear that the standard interpretation that allows functional
variables to range over sets of objects is inadequate for
Frege's theory.
In Part III of the Begr1ffsschrlft Frege begins to use
second-order quantification to develop his definition of the
ancestral of a relation. Frege translates certain of the
formulas of Part III into words. On examination of these
translations it becomes evident that the functional letters
are intended to range over properties and relations. In
particular, formula (76), which 1s Frege's definition of the
proper ancestral of a relation, contains a universal second-
order quantifier. Frege says that (76) "can be rendered into
words somewhat as follows":
If from the two propositions that every result of
an application of the procedure r to x has property
F and that F 1s hereditary in the r-sequence, it
can be inferred, whatever F may be, that y has the
property F, then I say: 'y follows x in the f-sequence,.33
Here Frege translates the universal quantifier as "whatever
F may be" and talks of "property F" and "the procedure rtf.
Procedures are just relations and properties are concepts.
Frege does not, however, give us any clear characterization
of properties and procedures. He does, as I have pointed out,
33. van He1jenoort, p. 60.
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lapse into using the definite article, he talks of "the property
" d "th d "... an e proce ure ....
relations saturated objects?
Are these properties and
Frege does say that the
translation 1s a rough one, and I shall assume that his use
of the definite article 1s due to an "awkwardness of langua~e".
No matter how these properties and relations are
characterized, if they exist then they must be contained in
the rang~ of the first-order variablesj for the range of the
first-order variables is the entire universe. However, if the
range of the second-order variables 1s included in the range
of the first-order variables, we find Frege very close to
Russell's paradox. Consider:
( • ) (3 F) (V x ) (F ( x) ..-. -A ( x , x ) )
The formula (I) 1s an instance of the comprehension axiom
schema and hence 1s a theorem of Frege's theory. Frege does
not tell us how to interpret formulas for the form
(3 F ) ( • • • • • • F ( )......)
yet from what he does say it seems that such fornulas are to
be read as
There 1s a property such that ...
Let us say that an object has a property ~ J.tlSt in case ~ applies
to that object. If we suppose that properties exist, it follows
that they are in the range of the individual variables. If
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we let 'A(x,x)' stand for 'x is a property that does not apply
to itself' then (*) becomes:
There is a property that applies to an object
if and only if that object is a property that
does not apply to itself.
On the supposition that properties are themselves things in
the universe, this interpretation of (*) gives us Russell's
paradox. The odious interpretation can be avoided if it is
stipulated that the range of 'F' 1s not included in the range
of the individual variables. Yet then it would follow that
some values of functional variables are not in the universe.
This way out of the paradox is not suggested by anything
Frege writes. He certainly talks as it properties and relations
exist, and hence are in the universe. When introducing
second-order quantifications he states no quallfication··.··'about
the range of their variables. Just as first-order quantifications
express generalities about things in the universe, so second-
order quantifications express generalities about properties
and relations. Any restrictions on the range of the second-
order variables must be seen as ad h££.
Frege says nothing to exclude properties and relations
from the range of the individual variables, and he never
considers alternative interpretations or models for his system.
All this lends support to van Heljenoort's claim that
Frege 1s "on the brink of a paradox". Although the system
is a consistent one. the interpretation of the system that is
-'---~---'-------------""'_!!!!!!!1!!!1111--------==--=--
138
suggested by the text does lead to Russell's paradox.
Another problem that arises in connection with the inter-
pretation of the system presented in the Begr1ffsschrlft 1s
one associated with the problem with the concept horse. If
the values of the second-order val'lables are not saturated
objects and have the required incompleteness of the Fregean
function, the how do we accordingly interpret second-order
existence claims? We have seen that the quantifier
There 1s such a thing as
has the peculiar feature that all its grammatical completions
assert the existence of objects and not concepts or functions.
The problem 1s: If properties and relations do exist, how
can we name these values of second-order variables without
naming objects?
Frege needs the means to express grammatically second-
order existence claims. If properties and relations cannot
be named by proper names then the natural language quantifier
above 1s an inadequate translation of the second-order existential
quantifier. Yet there seems to be no other way to interpret
formulas such as
There is another related problem. Consider the formula:
(V x) (F ( x) " -F (x ) ) •
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This would be interpreted as meaning:
Everything is such that either it has prcperty F
or it joes not have property F.
If properties are in the universe then one instance of this
formula 1s:
Property F either has property F Or it does not.
However, given Frege's doctrines concerning concepts and
objects, this is ungra~~atlcal. We cannot grammatically
predicate having property F or failing to have property F of
property F. Thus in light of the Fregean hierarchy of objects,
concepts, and functions, neither disjunct 1s grammatical.
This would be avoided if the universe of discourse for the
different types of variables were distinct. Yet they cannot
be distinct if the individual variables range over everything
that there is. Evey if this problem were resolved, Frege would
be left with the problem of grammatically asserting the
existence of properties and relations.
Thus while van Heljenoort 1s incorrect in claiming that the
system presented in the Begr1ffsschrlft leads to an inconsis-
tency or paradox, the interpretation suggested by Frege's
text does anticipate some serious problems that arise in
Frege's later writings.
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